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Taking the Oceanfront Lot
JOSH EAGLE*
Oceanfront landowners and states share a property boundary that runs between
the wet and dry parts of the shore. This legal coastline is different from an ordinary
land boundary. First, on sandy beaches, the line is constantly in flux, and it cannot
be marked except momentarily. Without the help of a surveyor and a court, neither
the landowner nor a citizen walking down the beach has the ability to know exactly
where the line lies. This uncertainty means that, as a practical matter, ownership of
some part of the beach is effectively shared. Second, the common law establishes that
the owner of each oceanfront lot holds easement-like interests in adjacent
state-owned land; and, the state holds similar interests in the oceanfront lot. For
these two reasons, the legal relationship between the oceanfront owner and the state
is more interdependent than it may seem at first. It is much more than the usual
neighbor relationship.
Disputes over oceanfront property are often framed as cases of wrongful taking
under the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause. The Supreme Court has
historically applied its standard takings test for determining whether or not a state
is liable for the impact of its rules on a landowner’s rights. This Article is the first to
examine the question of whether use of this standard test is optimal, or even logical,
in cases between states and the owners of oceanfront land. Given the fact that climate
change impacts such as sea-level rise are likely to increase rates of conflict along
the legal coastline, the potential benefits of a test that takes into account the special
relationship between these parties are significant. Support for an alternative test can
be found in two sets of common law property rules, the upland rights and public trust
doctrines, as well as in a mechanism that nineteenth-century courts used to resolve
similar disputes.
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[T]he public right of way [in navigable waters] is paramount. . . . This does not mean
that the riparian owner can make no use of the stream or its bed which will in any way
interfere with the right of navigation. Such a requirement would be unreasonable . . . . In
many cases, also, a little yielding of absolute right by both interests will permit both to
obtain greater benefit from the stream.
– Henry Philip Farnham1

INTRODUCTION
A state legislature seeks to protect its oceanfront beaches by establishing a
no-build zone that prevents new construction within 300 feet of the sea.2 A state’s
highest court issues an order that requires an oceanfront landowner to allow members
of the public to walk across the sandy part of her property.3
In both of these scenarios, it would not be difficult to argue that the government’s
action has altered the owner’s prior property rights. Accordingly, the landowner

1. 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 137–38 (1904).
In this quote, Farnham describes the relationship between landowners, whose property abuts
navigable rivers and streams, and the state, which holds title to the beds of those waterways
for the benefit of the public. The central argument of this Article is based on the proposition
that oceanfront landowners share a similar relationship with the state, which holds title to lands
seaward of their property.
Although the common law referred to land on rivers and streams as riparian and land on
oceans and lakes as littoral, I use the term “upland property” to refer to both. This is consistent
with modern law, which generally does not distinguish between the two kinds of property.
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Scope of Riparian Rights, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01
n.2 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed., 2012).
2. Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008–09 (1992). A state would, in
reality, measure this distance not from the sea, but from the “legal coastline,” that is, the
property boundary separating private uplands from state-owned lands. I use the generic term
“legal coastline” because rules for locating the line vary among the states. JOSH EAGLE,
COASTAL LAW 89–99 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that the location of the line is a matter of state law,
except where title to the upland property can be traced to a federal patent). See also Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 291–92 (1967) (tracing title to the upland property to a time before
the state constitution existed and determining federal law applied); Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22 (1935) (holding that rights and interests in tideland are matters of
state law). For more on legal coastlines, see infra Part II.A.1.
3. Cf. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984);
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993).
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could claim, pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,4 that the
government owes her just compensation for, respectively, a regulatory or judicial
taking.5 How should a court determine whether the government is liable?
Historically, the Supreme Court has framed takings claims arising out of
oceanfront property the same way it frames all unintentional takings claims.6 This
standard takings model emphasizes the “extent of the diminution”7: the difference in
a plaintiff’s property rights before and after the state has changed the rules. So, in the
first case above, a court would be concerned with the impact of the no-build zone on
the landowner’s right to use and enjoy her property. The outcome of the second case
would likely ride on the extent to which the court order has modified the landowner’s
prior right to exclude.
There is a problem, though, in applying a diminution-based model—insofar as it
casts the plaintiff as a rights holder and the government as a rights taker—to
oceanfront property cases.8 The fact is that each oceanfront lot shares a physical
boundary with state property: along the legal coastline, the state is the plaintiff’s
next-door neighbor and a rights holder as well.9 Because the state is a property owner,
it is possible to view state legislation and court orders as something very different
from regulation, that is, as assertions of the state’s own property rights.10
Viewed this way, the alleged taking of an oceanfront lot takes the form of a private
nuisance action or a boundary dispute.11 So, we can construe legislation establishing
a no-build area as a claim that the state has the right to prevent activities on
neighboring private property if those activities are likely to interfere with its use and

4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. State constitutions also contain takings clauses that are
identical to or nearly identical to the version in the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 19; MASS. CONST. art. X; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
5. The Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for a regulatory taking in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), and for a judicial taking in Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S.
702, 725–28 (2010) (plurality opinion). Both types of claims are based on the premise that the
government can unintentionally, effectively condemn property through the adoption of new
and different property rules. See infra Part I.A.
6. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
151 (1971) (describing the Court’s consistent use of a “dominant doctrinal model of takings
law”).
7. Justice Holmes proposed this as a tool for assessing the impact of regulation in
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. For more on the centrality of diminution in regulatory
and judicial takings doctrine, see infra Part I.A.
8. Professor Michelman used the phrase “publicly inflicted private injury” as shorthand
for the idea that takings law paints the government as actor and the property owner as acted
upon. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967).
9. In a brief paper, Professor Sax discussed some of the implications of owner-owner
(considering both the private landowner and the government as possessing ownership rights)
takings cases. See Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels, Beach
Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 641 (2010).
10. The common law recognized and limited the state’s property rights with respect to
tidal and submerged public trust lands. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.3.
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enjoyment rights; and, we can construe the court order as a claim that the state holds
an appurtenant easement, for the benefit of the public, over the adjacent upland
property.
What kind of test would be appropriate for determining whether the state has
exceeded its rights in making these claims? Is there any reason to believe that, beyond
accounting for the fact that the state is a property owner, a different type of test would
produce better—more efficient and fairer—results?
Over the course of the nineteenth century, prior to the advent of the regulatory
and judicial takings doctrines, courts developed a test specifically for disputes
between the state and owners of waterfront land, including oceanfront land.12 The
facts in these cases were different from those of the modern oceanfront case: the
disputes were not over rule changes, but rather over the impact of the state’s actual
property use on waterfront owners’ riparian rights.13 For instance, in a common
variant, the upland owner complained that rail lines constructed on adjacent state
submerged lands interfered with the upland owner’s common law right to enjoy
access to the water.14
Although the tests courts used to determine government liability in these
waterfront takings cases varied from state to state, the typical version resembled the
test used in the private nuisance action, another kind of neighborly dispute.15 The
“waterfront takings test” shared two key features with private nuisance law. First, it
promoted fundamental uses of waterfront property, both public and private, by giving
them priority in disputes.16 These fundamental uses were synched with key
ecosystem services provided by waterways: the possibility of navigation, the
facilitation of commerce, and opportunities for commercial and subsistence fishing.17
Second, the waterfront takings test attempted, where possible, to reconcile
conflicting uses by using the same “unreasonable interference” metric used in
nuisance law.18 This standard incorporates flexibility, allowing courts to consider
whether the degree of interference is necessary to accomplish the state’s objectives,

12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See Alfred E. McCordic & Wilson G. Crosby, The Right of Access and the Right To
Wharf Out to Navigable Water, 4 HARV. L. REV. 14, 18–19 (1890).
14. See infra Part I.B.2.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 887–88 (1997)
(“[Ecosystem services are] basic services that support life itself—services such as purification
of air and water, pest control, renewal of soil fertility, climate regulation, pollination of crops
and vegetation, and waste detoxification and decomposition.”). See also J.B. Ruhl, Valuing
Nature’s Services: The Future of Environmental Law?, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 359,
360 (1998); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for
Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1999).
The common law calls these key ecosystem services “public uses” or “trust purposes.” See
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892); District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc.,
750 F.2d 1077, 1082–83 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In this Article, I use “trust uses” to describe the
uses of trust property sanctioned by the law; I use “trust purposes” and “key services” to
describe the products created by application of state trust law to trust property, for example,
the supply of public navigational opportunities.
18. See infra Part I.B.
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within the narrow geographic setting of the conflict.19 The typical version of the
waterfront takings test essentially asked whether the government’s action was
reasonably necessary to protect a fundamental use.20
Unlike diminution-based tests, the waterfront takings test was not concerned with
how the private owner and the government had used their respective properties in the
past.21 Instead, the test focused, like nuisance law, on resolving the conflict so as to
accommodate both parties while maximizing property values moving forward.22
This Article explores the question of whether the waterfront takings test, although
developed for a different type of unintentional taking, might be—in comparison to
the modern, diminution-based tests—a fairer and more efficient way to resolve
regulatory and judicial takings cases involving oceanfront property. These concerns
are of great importance, especially given the fact that the predicted effects of climate
change, such as sea-level rise and enhanced storm damage, are almost certain to
increase rates of conflict.23
Part I of this Article summarizes the modern, diminution-based approach to
takings and contrasts it with the approach embodied in the waterfront takings test.
Part II examines two sets of common law property rules, private upland rights and
the public trust doctrine, that were the foundation upon which courts built the
waterfront takings test. Part III uses the facts of some modern oceanfront property
takings cases to illustrate the challenges in, as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of, applying the waterfront takings test to cases with typical modern
features.24 A brief conclusion follows Part III.

19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights,
and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 79–82 (2012); Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at
the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 567–74 (2007); Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise
Adaptation Tools Takings Proof, 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2012).
24. I use the following cases as examples: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
825 (1987), Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), and Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993).
Interestingly, many of the U.S. Supreme Court’s important takings opinions since 1982
were the result of waterfront property disputes. One landmark case, discussed at Part III.B
infra, involved property located on Winnapaug Pond, a coastal, saltwater lagoon adjoining the
Atlantic Ocean. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). Others include Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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I. TWO APPROACHES TO TAKINGS
A. The Standard Test: Government Limitation of Vested Rights
The Takings Clause implicitly recognizes that federal and state governments
have, through their eminent domain power, the authority to condemn private
property.25 The purpose of the Takings Clause is to place two limits on that authority:
condemnations must be for “public use” and the government must pay “just
compensation” to the owner of the condemned property.26
In 1922, the Court recognized a claim for what later became known as a
“regulatory taking.”27 The theory behind the claim is simple. While many laws limit
property rights, there is a point at which—from the owner’s perspective—the
limitations are so severe that they equate to an effective condemnation: from the point
of view of a landowner, there is no difference between an intentional condemnation
and a law prohibiting her from using it, excluding others, and transferring it.28 While
the theory is simple, the law’s task of separating effective condemnations from lesser,
noncompensable impacts is not. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes relied
primarily on “the extent of the diminution”—the injury to the plaintiff’s property
rights—as a tool for detecting virtual equivalence.29

25. The Takings Clause protects “‘[p]roperty interests . . . created and . . . defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’”
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). For examples of real property and the Takings
Clause, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (statute might
take fee title), and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute takes mineral
estate). For examples of personal property and the Takings Clause, see Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (statute takes interest on escrowed funds),
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (Takings Clause applicable to eagle feathers), and
Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Takings Clause applicable to
oil tankers). For an example involving intellectual property and the Takings Clause, see
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (Takings Clause applicable to trade
secrets). But see Zoltek v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (relief for alleged
taking of patent available only through patent infringement regime).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. State constitutions also contain takings clauses, identical or
nearly identical to the version in the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19;
MASS. CONST. art. X; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
27. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. The Court did not actually use the term
“regulatory taking” until 1981. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 651 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28.
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as
unified, [our] inquiries . . . share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his
domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the
burden that government imposes upon private property rights.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
29. 260 U.S. at 413. In his opinion, Justice Holmes was not clear regarding the units to be
used in calculating diminution. See id.
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The modern regulatory takings test—set out in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City30—continues to emphasize diminution. Under the Penn Central
test, each of the two factors courts weigh in determining whether a taking has
occurred relate to diminution. Under the first, courts are to consider “the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations.”31 This is an
elaboration of Justice Holmes’s “extent of the diminution” test. The second factor,
“the character of the governmental action,”32 is more opaque. Although courts have
interpreted this language in several ways, the most common interpretation
emphasizes the distributional effects of the regulation: the finding that a taking has
occurred is more appropriate in cases in which the “[g]overnment [forces] some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”33 Stated differently, the “character” factor focuses on the
extent to which diminutions have been evenly spread across affected property
owners.
From 1922 until 2010, the Court limited the “virtually equivalent to a
condemnation” claim to acts of the legislative and executive branches. In Stop the
Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,34 a
plurality of the Court expanded the group of government actors that could take
private property to include state courts: when a state’s highest court declares that
“what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken
that property.”35 This language, and the Court’s repeated use of the word “eliminate”
as a fulcrum of liability, make it clear that the judicial takings test is again framing
takings in terms of diminution.36

30. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
31. Id. at 124.
32. Id.
33. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Courts have interpreted Penn
Central’s “character of governmental action” factor in a variety of ways—at least nine. John
D. Echeverria, The “Character” Factor in Regulatory Takings Analysis, in ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY: WETLANDS LAW AND REGULATION 146 (2005), Westlaw SK081 ALI-ABA 143; see
also Steven J. Eagle, “Character” as “Worthiness”: A New Meaning for Penn Central’s Third
Test?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., June 2004, at 1. The incorporation of distributional concerns
into takings jurisprudence can be traced back to Justice Holmes’s discussion of “average
reciprocity of advantage” in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Other situation-specific
interpretations of the character factor include (1) the nature of the private right limited by the
challenged rule (e.g., limitations on the owner’s right to exclude are more deserving of
compensation), and (2) the nature of the government interference (e.g., government action
that results in permanent, physical occupation of the property always merits compensation).
See Horne v. Dep’t. of Agric., No. 14-275, slip op. at 7 (U.S. June 22, 2015); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
34. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
35. Id. at 715 (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 722, 725, 726. A court first used the term “judicial taking” to describe the effect
of a significant judicial alteration of property law in 1933. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 25 P.2d 187, 188 (Colo. 1933). The first two cases in which a federal
court held that a state court had taken property were in the late 1970s. Sotomura v. Cnty. of
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For purposes of my argument, there are two important features of
diminution-based takings tests. First, they are premised on an initial identification of
pre-existing rights.37 In order to calculate the extent of diminution, a court must first
define what the owner’s rights were prior to enactment of the rule. Diminution-based
takings tests’ reliance on established prior rights can be contrasted with another
approach to resolving claims of alleged interference with property rights, namely
private nuisance law. As explained below, private nuisance law considers, but does
not put heavy weight on, a plaintiff’s rights prior to defendant’s alleged
interference.38 A second feature of diminution-based takings tests is that they frame
the dispute between the government and the property owner as one dimensional: the
property owner is the rights holder and the government is the rights cutter.39 As
Joseph Sax put it, “A court asks whether, and to what extent, the owner’s ability to
profit from the piece of property in question, considered by itself, has been
impaired.”40 I argue below that this framing is not apposite to disputes arising out of
oceanfront land in which both the state and the oceanfront owner hold property
rights.
B. The Waterfront Takings Test: Origins and Evolution
The idea that courts should treat disputes between states and waterfront owners in
a manner consistent with their status as neighboring property owners is an old one.

Haw., 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw.
1977), aff’d, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986); see Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1471 (1990). The first case in which
the Supreme Court recognized the judicial taking as a viable constitutional claim was Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702
(2010) (plurality opinion).
37. See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
307, 317–18 (2007) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 1069–70
(1992); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 164 (1980));
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 50–53 (1964) (describing the
importance of, and critiquing courts’ approach to, the initial rights-mapping process);
Thompson, supra note 36, at 1523 (noting the “Supreme Court’s adoption (or at least
purported adoption) of a positivist definition of property, under which the Court claims to
protect only those rights delineated by common law or by state and federal statutes (as
interpreted, of course, by relevant courts)”).
38. In a private nuisance case, a court is tasked with resolving a use conflict between two
landowners. Unless the defendant’s activity involves negligent or ultra-hazardous behavior,
the case will feature two lawful land uses, each of which would be permissible in isolation.
Each party’s land use interferes with the other’s: so, for example, vibration of the candy
maker’s equipment makes it impossible for the doctor to treat patients, and the doctor’s need
for quiet makes it impossible to manufacture candy. Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch. 852
(Eng.). A court’s task is to determine, using a rubric that assigns priority to land uses, whose
use the law ought to protect from unreasonable interference. Once a court makes that
determination and awards a remedy, the case is over.
39. As noted above, the standard tests ultimately consider distributional effects of the
challenged rule as well. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
40. Sax, supra note 6 at 151 (emphasis original).
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In the nineteenth century, courts developed what I call “the waterfront takings test”
specifically for such disputes. The test has not disappeared from the law; rather, it
seems to have been lost in the wash of modern takings law. The Supreme Court’s
2010 opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection41 illustrates how modern courts overlook the idea, even
when it appears before them.
Stop the Beach Renourishment began its life in the Florida courts as a regulatory
takings case.42 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the case morphed into
a judicial takings case. The issue was whether a state court, in the process of defining
a property owner’s prior rights, should be liable for grossly erroneous mapping, or
as the Court called it “overrul[ing] prior cases that establish property entitlements.”43
Described in greater detail in Part III, the substantive property law issue in Stop
the Beach Renourishment was whether, under Florida law, when the state deposited
sand on submerged land adjacent to plaintiffs’ property, it infringed on plaintiffs’
upland rights. Because, in this scenario, the state is acting not as regulator but as
property owner, it would seem appropriate to ask whether the state had the right to
deposit sand on its property, without regard for its impact on neighboring private
owners. In fact, at one point in the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia, citing to the 1957
Florida Supreme Court opinion in a case called Hayes v. Bowman,44 describes the
question in those terms: “the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral
property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not interfere with the rights
of the public and the rights of littoral landowners.”45 After this, however, the plurality
never returns to analyze the scope of the state’s property rights.
For reasons that are unclear, the plurality extracted only a fragment of Florida’s
common law waterfront takings test from Hayes v. Bowman.46 In Hayes, the Supreme
Court of Florida actually held that the state (or the state’s grantee) can interfere with
the rights of upland landowners, provided that it does not do so to an excessive
degree.47 This holding is consistent with the classic waterfront takings test, which
allows a state (or the state’s grantee) unfettered rights to use trust lands, without

41. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
42. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1120–21
(Fla. 2008).
43. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 727 (plurality opinion).
44. 91 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957).
45. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 730 (citing Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 799–800).
The plurality also cites Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1871), for the
proposition that “[t]he Takings Clause . . . applies as fully to the taking of a landowner’s
riparian rights as it does to the taking of an estate in land.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560
U.S. at 713. In Yates, Justice Miller states that “[the] riparian right is property, and is valuable,”
and then finishes his sentence with the remainder of a waterfront takings test: “and, though it
must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or
capriciously destroyed or impaired.” 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 504.
46. See 91 So. 2d at 799–800. For more on the plurality’s disjointed application of Florida
property law in Stop the Beach Renourishment, see infra Part III.A.
47. See Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 799–800. As a general rule, state grantees have the same
responsibilities to upland owners as the state. In effect, restrictions on state use, upon transfer,
remain in force as a form of deed restriction. See Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979); infra Part II.C.
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having to compensate upland owners, when the purpose of the use fits within that
state’s definition of valid public trust purposes.48 When the purpose of the challenged
use falls outside that definition, “the State [or its grantee] must so use the land as not
to interfere with the recognized common law [and statutory] riparian rights of upland
owners.”49 The fulcrum of liability under these circumstances is essentially whether
the interference is excessive or unreasonable.50 So, the Hayes court held that
“common law riparian rights . . . must be recognized over an area as near ‘as
practicable’ . . . between the upland and the Channel. This rule means that each case
necessarily must turn on the factual circumstances there presented . . . .”51 Because
the defendant in Hayes did not unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff’s rights, the
defendant prevailed.52
It is striking that the Court missed the opportunity to apply a test that was at its
fingertips, applicable to the facts at hand, and deeply rooted in the common law of
property.
1. Historical Context of Waterfront Disputes
From an early date, American courts emphasized the importance of sovereign
interests in navigable waters.53 In Gibbons v. Ogden,54 the Supreme Court noted that
“[t]he power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects
for which the people of America adopted their government.”55 About twenty years

48. See generally Daniel J. Morgan & David G. Lewis, The State Navigation Servitude,
4 LAND & WATER L. REV. 521 (1969). As discussed in Parts I and II, the classic trust purposes
are navigation, commerce, and fishing. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine:
A Conservative Reconstruction & Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 50 (2006).
49. Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 799.
50. The Hayes court explains that each upland owner is entitled to an equitable quantum
of each upland right, “giv[ing] due consideration to the lay of the upland shore line, the
direction of the Channel and the co-relative rights of adjoining upland owners.” Hayes, 91
So. 2d at 802.
51. Id. at 801. This approach agrees with earlier decisions of the Florida Supreme Court.
See Tampa S. R.R. Co. v. Nettles, 89 So. 223, 223 (Fla. 1921) (“[T]he common law rights of
a riparian owner to ingress and egress, navigation, fishing, bathing, and view in and over the
waters [were] not so unlawfully invaded by the defendant company as to justify an injunction.”
(emphasis added)).
52. 91 So. 2d at 801–03.
53. It is an understatement to say that “navigable” and “navigability” are terms of art in
the law. These words have many context-dependent legal meanings. See, e.g., Robert W.
Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law: The Historical, Yet Declining Role of
Navigability, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1643 (2013); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 764–66 (1986);
Merritt Starr, Navigable Waters of the United States—State and National Control, 35 HARV.
L. REV. 154 (1921); John F. Baughman, Note, Balancing Commerce, History, and Geography:
Defining the Navigable Waters of the United States, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1992). In this
Article, I use the term in its ordinary sense. I use the term “public waterways” to refer to those
waters that lie above state-owned, tidal and submerged, public trust lands.
54. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
55. Id. at 190. See generally WILLIAM J. HULL & ROBERT W. HULL, THE ORIGIN AND
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later, in Pollard v. Hagan,56 the Court emphasized the close connection between a
state’s very identity as a state and its ownership interest in the lands underlying
navigable waters:
This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under the
navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the
states within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they, and they
only, have the constitutional power to exercise it. To give to the United
States the right to transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the soils
under the navigable waters, would be placing in their hands a weapon
which might be wielded greatly to the injury of state sovereignty . . . .57
Such statements were a reflection of the economic importance of coastal waters
and rivers during the first half of the nineteenth century.58 From colonial times until
the development of railroads in the 1850s, there were two available means of
commercial transport: wagon and water. At the founding of the nation, it was obvious
to leaders and the public that waterborne commerce was the pathway to economic
growth. In the 1780s, George Washington pushed Maryland and Virginia to lead
construction of the Patowmack Canal: “The way is easy and dictated by our clearest
interest. It is to open a wide door, and make a smooth way for the produce of that
Country to pass to our Markets. . . .”59 Thomas Jefferson noted Americans’ “decided
taste for navigation & commerce.”60 By the early 1800s, waterways were by far the
most efficient option for moving goods.61 Between 1817 and 1839, states invested
heavily in the construction of canals, building systems totaling nearly 3000 miles.62
Government construction of canals, which were often used to connect navigable
segments of natural waterways, represented one approach to increasing the value of
navigability services. Another way to enhance the value of this ecosystem service

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATERWAYS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1967).
56. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
57. Id. at 230.
58. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 431–32 (1989) (“To the early
settlers, the rivers furnished paths of exploration and avenues for the fur trade and log floats.
Due to the density of forests and the difficulty of road construction, the watercourses provided
transportation routes, and their shores afforded logical areas for settlement.” (footnotes
omitted)). See generally id. at 431–39.
59. WARREN ROBERTS, A PLACE IN HISTORY: ALBANY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1775–1825, at 230 (2010) (quoting George Washington). See generally JOEL ACHENBACH,
THE GRAND IDEA: GEORGE WASHINGTON’S POTOMAC AND THE RACE TO THE WEST (2004).
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Count Gysbert-Charles van Hogendorp (Oct. 13,
1785), in 4 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 469 (Fed. ed. 1904).
61. Jeremy Atack, Fred Bateman & William N. Parker, The Farm, the Farmer, and the
Market, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 250 (Stanley L.
Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Entrepreneurship,
Business Organization, and Economic Concentration, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 418 (noting that, during the early 1800s, the ton-mile cost of
wagon haulage was twenty times greater than the cost of using waterways and canals); see
also Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 434 & nn.40–41.
62. Lamoreaux, supra note 61, at 418.
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was to make access to waterways less expensive. States could do this by, for example,
financing the construction of facilities, such as wharves and warehouses, that were
useful in the loading and offloading of goods and people.63 A shortage of such
facilities would obviously render increases in the supply of navigable miles of
waterway much less meaningful.
Beginning in the colonial era, American courts and legislatures invented an
ingenious alternative to government financing: the subsidization of private
investment through the granting of new rights to upland owners. In Massachusetts’s
Colonial Ordinance of 1641, the government extended the legal coastline seaward,
giving upland owners title to adjacent state trust lands down to the low-water mark.64
(Under English common law, the Crown owned up to the high-water mark.)65 The
purpose of the ordinance was “to induce persons to erect wharves below high water
mark, which were necessary to the purposes of commerce.”66 Other jurisdictions took
the less sweeping, but equally nontraditional,67 approach of recognizing a “right to
wharf out,” that is, a right to use adjacent state trust lands for the construction of a
wharf or to fill those trust lands out to the navigable channel.68 These rules subsidized
private investment by offering use of adjacent state trust lands free of charge and by
giving upland owners the right to prevent the state and private parties from
constructing wharves on adjacent trust lands.69
It is easy to understand how this economic partnership between states and upland
owners benefits both upland owners and the public. The public trust doctrine requires
that states dedicate submerged and tidal lands (and in effect, the overlying “trust
areas,” that is, public waterways) to public use for navigation, commerce, and
fishing.70 To the extent that public access to each of these activities requires an
upland interface, investment by upland owners is a substitute for funds that the state
would otherwise have to expend to provide the same level of benefits. Moreover, by

63. A wharf is “a landing place or pier where ships may tie up and load or unload.” THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1559 (4th ed. 2007).
64. Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts
Colonial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 623, 631–33 (1998).
65. Id.
66. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 77 (1851); see also Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1894) (“The governments of the several colonies, with a view to
induce persons to erect wharves for the benefit of navigation and commerce, early allowed to
the owners of lands bounding on tide waters greater rights and privileges in the shore below
high water mark, than they had in England. But the nature and degree of such rights and
privileges differed in the different Colonies, and in some were created by statute, while in
others they rested upon usage only.”).
67. “The right to wharf out to navigable water is unknown to the common law of England.
The erection of a wharf upon public lands without the consent of the Crown is a purpresture.”
McCordic & Crosby, supra note 13, at 14; see also People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287, 293
(1863) (“A purpresture is an invasion of the right of property in the soil, while the same
remains in the king or the people.”).
68. McCordic & Crosby, supra note 13, at 19–24.; see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 18–26
(describing how state law, through legislation or the doctrine of custom, incorporated the right
to wharf out).
69. See infra Part II.B.1.
70. See infra Part II.A.
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creating widely applicable legal incentives, the state is creating the possibility of
competition in the business of providing upland interfaces. Absent collusion, more
wharves and more competition will result in lower shipping costs.
At the same time, it is also easy to see how strengthening upland rights could lead
to litigation between upland owners and the state. In a world of weak upland rights,
the state is free to use or to sell its submerged lands as it sees fit.71 So, if the state
desired to fill submerged lands and build a railroad in front of an upland owner’s lot,
thereby eliminating all of the upland owner’s access to the water, it could do so
without fear of liability. Similarly, the state could transfer those same lands to a
railroad company for the same purpose without any concerns.72
The increased commercial importance of railroads in the second half of the
nineteenth century did, in fact, lead to repeated conflicts between the state (or
state-transferee railroad companies) and upland property owners.73 There were many
reasons why it made economic sense for railroad companies to, where possible,
install their lines along navigable rivers.74 While states were eager to lend railroads
the eminent domain power necessary to condemn private land or easements, it was
simpler and less costly for the railroad to avoid eminent domain altogether: a state
could transfer an easement to a railroad company to use state trust property for a
nominal fee.
Absent upland rights, the railroad company would not have to pay anything
beyond this nominal fee for installing lines along rivers. The existence of enforceable
upland rights meant that, at the same time railroad companies used state lands, they
were also “using” upland rights, interfering with landowners’ valuable connections
to the adjacent public waterways. These conflicts forced courts to determine the
parameters of state and upland owners’ property rights.

71. The only limits on state use of its trust property would be the public trust doctrine.
See infra Part II.A.
72. Again, the state’s ability to transfer trust property would be subject to limitations in
the public trust doctrine. Whether a court would prevent a state from making a transfer would
depend on, among other things, the court’s interpretation of the exceptions to the public trust
doctrine’s “duty not to dispose.” See infra Part II.A.
73. See infra Part I.B.2.
74. First, as a result of the importance of river-borne commerce prior to 1850, populations
and trading centers were located along rivers. Second, river beds and valleys are flatter than
surrounding areas, making installation of rail beds less expensive. Finally, state ownership of
lands below the high-water mark made it cheaper to build rail lines on fill or pilings than across
nearby, privately-owned land. See generally RICHARD T.T. FORMAN ET AL., ROAD ECOLOGY:
SCIENCE AND SOLUTIONS (2003) (describing the interplay between ecology and the
development of transportation routes); CARLOS A. SCHWANTES, RAILROAD SIGNATURES
ACROSS THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1993) (describing the ways railroads acted as engines of
regional development); Paul Blanton & W. Andrew Marcus, Railroads, Roads and Lateral
Disconnection in the River Landscapes of the Continental United States, 112
GEOMORPHOLOGY 212, 213 (2009) (describing the development of railways along the banks
of rivers).
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2. The Common Law Development of the Waterfront Takings Test
American courts, during the first half of the nineteenth century, gave states nearly
absolute control over use of state-owned submerged lands. During this period, courts
gave states more power than even the English courts had given the Crown75: the state
was a sovereign owner of property whose use of that property always trumped
competing private interests.76 By the 1870s, however, courts in many states had come
to recognize that this approach was inconsistent with the public-private partnership.
The result was the development of a structured, fact-specific “waterfront takings test”
that sought to maximize navigability services: protecting trust uses from more than
minor interferences while at the same time protecting upland uses that were more or
less consistent with maximizing navigability.77
The development of the law in New York courts between 1850 and 1900
exemplifies this transition. In Gould v. Hudson River Railroad Co.,78 the plaintiff
owned a farm along the Hudson River. The plaintiff made use of his common law
upland right of access to the adjacent waterway “for the purpose of removing produce
and other lawful purposes.”79 In granting incorporation to the railroad company, the
State of New York authorized it to construct the rail line on private property (via use
of the state’s eminent domain power) or on public property (below the high water
mark of the river, that is, on state trust lands) along the Hudson River from New York
City to Albany.80 The railroad chose to install a solid embankment, topped by tracks,
on trust property between Gould’s farm and the river.81 Gould sued, claiming that the
railroad owed him just compensation for eliminating his right of access.82 The Court
of Appeals of New York held that the railroad owed no compensation because only
the “sovereign power, acting through the legislature” could “judge of the necessity”
of destroying the “right of the appellant”83: “It cannot be possible that such necessity
is to be left to be judged of by the circumstances of each particular case.”84

75. Under the English common law version of the public trust doctrine, the Crown was
not free to use or transfer trust property without the consent of Parliament. See infra Part II.A.2.
76. See Molly Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy,
1789–1920, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1403, 1403–13.
77. It is also likely that the evolution of the test reflected a broader trend of legal
conservatism. Molly Selvin notes that “[between 1870 and 1920], nineteen states . . . amended
their constitutions by inserting the words, ‘or damaged’ into eminent domain provisions.” Id.
at 1424 n.55. This language “resulted in [more and greater] judicial awards . . . in favor of
private litigants and against state-sanctioned or state-constructed enterprises.” Id.
78. 6 N.Y. 522 (1852).
79. Id. at 545 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 544–45.
81. Id. at 545.
82. Id. at 523 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 543.
84. Id. Other courts adopted the same rule on the rationale that the upland owner is simply
a member of the public who enjoys easy access to trust amenities and thus has no standing to
challenge legislative decisions to use trust property. See Stevens v. Paterson & Newark R.R.
Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 538–39 (1870).
A few years before the Court of Appeals of New York decided Gould v. Hudson River
Railroad Co., 6 N.Y. 522 (1852), Joseph K. Angell published the second edition of his Treatise
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Forty years later, the Court of Appeals reversed course. The facts in Rumsey v.
New York & New England Railroad Co.85 were almost identical to those in Gould.
With permission from the state, the railroad had installed its tracks along the Hudson
on trust lands in front of Rumsey’s brickyard.86 Initially, the railroad had built a
tunnel through the embankment beneath the tracks; the tunnel, or culvert, allowed
the owners of the brickyard to convey bricks from the plant for loading onto barges.87
Later, perhaps after having read the opinion in Gould,88 railroad officials authorized
further construction that blocked the useful culvert. The court opined that the Gould
court had erroneously interpreted prior New York cases. Specifically, the Rumsey
court read those cases as holding that the state (or its grantee) could completely
eliminate private upland rights only where trust lands were used “to promote
commerce and navigation” on the public waterway.89
In addition to limiting the scope of the state’s public trust trump card, the court
made it clear that liability for use of trust lands outside that scope, that is, for nontrust
purposes, could arise only where the interference with private rights was too extreme.
Rumsey was not entitled to damages from the date the railroad was built, but from
the date the railroad blocked the culvert and thereby eliminated the possibility of
access.90
The dramatic development of the common law in this area over the course of the
nineteenth century is captured in a section of Henry Farnham’s 1904 treatise The
Law of Waters and Water Rights entitled “Rights Between Public and Individual.”
In contrast with sovereign supremacy inherited from English common law and
expressed in cases such as Gould, Farnham describes a set of rules that describes the
kind of mutual give-and-take befitting neighbors and partners:
[T]he public right of way [in navigable waters] is paramount. That is the
principal use of the stream when it is navigable, and [private] rights must
give way to it so far as necessary to preserve the right of navigation. This
does not mean that the riparian owner can make no use of the stream or
its bed which will in any way interfere with the right of navigation. Such
a requirement would be unreasonable . . . . In many cases, also, a little
yielding of absolute right by both interests will permit both to obtain

on the Right of Property in Tide Waters and in the Soil and Shores Thereof. Angell presents
what appears to be a diametrically opposite rule: “Riparian proprietors . . . cannot be cut off
from the water against their consent by any extraneous addition to their upland.” JOSEPH K.
ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS AND IN THE SOIL AND
SHORES THEREOF 171 (2d ed. 1847). The cases cited by Angell do pit uplands owners against
the state; however, the conflicts are over state attempts to transfer upland rights to third parties,
not over state use or transfers that interfere with upland rights. See Bowman v. Wathen, 3 F.
Cas. 1076 (D. Ind. 1841). The former class of cases should be analyzed differently insofar as
they represent a form of prohibited private-to-private condemnation. See infra Part II.B.1.
85. 30 N.E. 654 (N.Y. 1892).
86. Id. at 654.
87. Id.
88. The railroad did not build its track until 1854, but I suppose it is possible that its
lawyers had not read the 1852 opinion in Gould in the intervening two years.
89. Rumsey, 30 N.E. at 655.
90. Id. at 656.
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greater benefit from the stream. When it is said that the right of the public
is paramount, nothing more is meant than that the riparian owner can do
nothing to close the highway. . . . Conversely, the right of public
navigation is not such as to destroy the rights of the riparian owner. The
right cannot be exercised to the unnecessary or wanton destruction of
private rights, or so as to deprive riparian proprietors of the use of the
stream for legitimate purposes which will not unreasonably interfere with
the right of navigation. . . . The rights may be said to be reciprocal, each
modifying the other, each to be used so as not to interfere with the other
right.91
Many state courts ultimately adopted a waterfront takings test that reflected these
principles.92 Although language varied, the test generally included three rules: If the
state or its transferee used trust lands for trust purposes, no compensation was owed;
if the use of trust lands was beyond the scope of the trust, compensation was owed
for unreasonable interference with upland rights; along the same lines, the state was
entitled to, without compensation, prevent upland owners from exercising upland
rights if the exercise of those rights interfered with trust uses of public waterways.93
Application of these tests was fact intensive. Courts policed the scope of the
public trust, inquiring whether in fact the particular state use of trust lands was truly

91. 1 FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 137–38.
92. See, e.g., Mauldin v. Cent. of Ga. Ry., 61 So. 947 (Ala. 1913); Pearson v. Rolfe, 76
Me. 380 (1884); Buchanan v. G. R. Log Co., 12 N.W. 490 (Mich. 1882); Comm’rs of Burke
Cnty. v. Catawba Lumber Co., 21 S.E. 941 (N.C. 1895); Trullinger v. Howe, 97 P. 548 (Or.
1908); Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington Steamship Co., 12 R.I. 348,
369 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring); A.C. Conn Co. v. Little Suamico Lumber & Mfg. Co., 43
N.W. 660 (Wis. 1889).
93. Federal courts have long employed a somewhat similar test to determine when the
federal government owes compensation to upland owners for impacts of projects undertaken
to maintain or improve navigability. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); Owen v. United
States, 851 F.2d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Alameda Gateway, Ltd. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl.
757 (1999). The federal government’s interest in navigable waterways—known as the
navigation or navigational servitude—is, unlike states’ interests, based not on the ownership
of land but on the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. Rands,
389 U.S. at 122–23; Owen, 851 F.2d at 1408 (citing Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
713, 724–25 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 (1824)); Alameda Gateway,
45 Fed. Cl. at 763 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 192) (citing Gilman, 70 U.S. at 724). In fact,
most commentators characterize the government’s interest not as property, but rather as the
authority to maintain or improve navigability without liability, that is, as a takings defense.
See, e.g., Richard W. Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation—Struggle for
a Doctrine, 48 OR. L. REV. 1 (1968); Eva H. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The
Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1963). But see
Silver Springs Paradise Co. v. Ray, 50 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1931) (noting that federal
navigation servitude is a “right possessed in common” by the American people, and as such
gives citizens affirmative rights to use navigable waters “for all legitimate purposes of travel
or transportation”). Due to the fact that the navigation servitude is not property, the test courts
use to assess the federal government’s liability does not reflect, as the waterfront takings test
does, the complexities of owner-owner relationships.
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in furtherance of trust purposes.94 In deciding whether a state’s land use unreasonably
interfered with the exercise of a particular upland owner’s rights, courts considered
the physical features of the specific parcel of upland property.95 Finally, courts
carefully considered the extent to which an upland owner’s actions would actually
interfere with the provision of key trust services.96
Courts in a few states continued (and still continue) to employ the absolutist rule
that the state can use trust lands, and restrict upland owners’ rights, without the fear
of liability. Some states, such as Washington and New Jersey, literally adopted the
Gould rule, taking the view that upland rights are pure licenses.97 Other states
ostensibly apply the waterfront takings test, but do so in a way that leads to
Gould-like results. In these states, courts interpret the term “trust uses” broadly, far
beyond navigation, commerce, fishing, and recreation.98 In doing so, courts increase
the size of the realm in which states can operate without liability.99 As noted in Part
II.C, an unprincipled approach to broadening the definition of trust uses is harmful
not only to upland owners, but also to the public.

94. See Natcher v. City of Bowling Green, 95 S.W.2d 255, 259–60 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936)
(holding that the city’s construction of dam for water supply was outside scope of trust
purposes; city liable for unreasonable interference with plaintiff’s upland rights); State v.
Preston, 207 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (“It is clear in this case that this [bridge
built across public waterway] is a nonnavigational improvement.”).
95. See Krieter v. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111, 112–13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (denying
permit to build dock in part on the grounds that plaintiff had other means of access from
property); Becker v. Litty, 566 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Md. 1989) (finding that although bridge
interferes with plaintiffs’ right of access, the fact that plaintiffs have other means of access
from their property means interference is not unreasonable).
96. See Pearson, 76 Me. at 391 (stating that “‘the rights of the public and those of the
riparian owners are both to be enjoyed with a proper regard to the existence and preservation
of the other. . . . In streams which are only floatable, the riparian owner is only bound not to
obstruct its reasonable use for that purpose’”) (quoting JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF WATERS, INCLUDING RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN WATERS
TIDAL AND INLAND 198 (1883)).
97. See, e.g., Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 26 P. 539 (Wash. 1891); Stevens v. Paterson &
Newark R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532 (1870). Even in states that recognize upland rights as property
rights, the law treats those rights as contingent easements, that is, as rights that can be exercised
under specified conditions: where they do not unreasonably interfere with key-service
provision. See Krieter, 595 So. 2d at 112. The difference between absolute-sovereignty states
and contingent-easement states is that, in the former, the state could—at least on positive law
grounds—eliminate all upland rights without compensation. In contingent-easement states, a
law or judicial opinion eliminating all rights, without a clear showing that doing so was
necessary in all cases in order to protect trust uses, would run afoul of the Takings Clause. Cf.
Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990).
98. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Colberg, Inc. v. State,
432 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1967) (en banc).
99. Morgan & Lewis, supra note 48, at 530.
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3. Timeless Takings: Economic Development Versus Expectations
The evolution of the waterfront takings test in some ways parallels the evolution
of law for resolving disputes over consumptive water use.100 Professor Morton
Horwitz argued that, in response to forces of economic development, American
courts gradually moved from rules that protected traditional uses of water to rules
that could accommodate new commercial and industrial uses: “By the time of the
Civil War, however, most courts had come to recognize a balancing test [for
resolving conflicts between water users], making ‘reasonable use’ of a stream
‘depend on the extent of the detriment to the riparian proprietors below.’”101
As Horwitz observed, riparian businesses wishing to put water to new uses faced
an obstacle: time. The English common law rules for consumptive water use entitled
every riparian owner to the right to the “natural flow” of the river, thus giving
downstream users substantial power. By protecting earlier, traditional uses of water,
the natural flow doctrine effectively locked in the prior generation’s version of an
economy.102
The “reasonable use” test developed by American courts represented a significant
departure from natural flow. Most importantly, the reasonable use test effectively
took time—long-standing, vested use—out of the equation. Under this approach, the
downstream user continued to have a water right, but could no longer object to de
minimis interference. In order to enjoin an upstream use, the downstream user was
required to show unreasonable interference, a much higher burden of proof. Horwitz
notes that courts based this change on something more than economic benefit to the
new user and the public. American courts reconceived the fundamental use of
property as productive use, in contrast to English law’s emphasis on quiet
enjoyment.103
Courts’ assignment of greater weight to upland owners’ rights in battles versus
the state created widespread benefits. In the case of upland rights such as the right of
access and the right to wharf out, stronger private rights increase both the value of
upland property and the value of the key ecosystem services provided by trust areas:
more (and less expensive) access to key services such as navigation and fishing
decreased the costs of goods and travel, and increased the availability of subsistence
and recreational hunting and fishing opportunities. In other words, strengthening
upland owners’ rights generated direct benefits for upland owners and the public.
Moreover, unlike changes to water law, the recognition of stronger upland rights did
not impose costs on other upland owners.104
Insofar as it represented a departure from absolute sovereign control of trust
property, one might see the waterfront takings test as a loss to the public. The

100. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at
31–53 (1977).
101. Id. at 40 (citing Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, 462 (1856)).
102. Id. at 35–40.
103. See id. at 36.
104. Harry Scheiber has illustrated similar effects in California’s development of
appropriative water rights and in other areas of nineteenth-century common law development,
challenging Horwitz’s account of “winners and losers in the courts.” Harry N. Scheiber, Public
Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217, 230 (1984).
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structure of the test, though, is ingenious: it protects waterways’ ability to produce
key trust services while simultaneously motivating private investment that enhances
the value of those services. The test is also efficient in that it allows both upland
owners and the state to undertake valuable activities that do not unreasonably
interfere with the production of key services.
The most important difference between the Gould rule and the evolved, two-step
waterfront takings test is that the latter, like the “reasonable use” rule for
consumptive water use and unlike the Penn Central test, places little to no weight on
prior rights.105 While prior rights are often viewed as synonymous with property,
there are important areas in which property law has demoted temporal concerns in
order to promote social (including both private and public) gains.106 Most relevant,
private nuisance law—like the waterfront takings test, a tool for resolving disputes
between neighbors—places only minor importance on the question of “who was
first?”107 Instead, the goal is to “prioritise[] property rights so that more fundamental
rights trump the less fundamental.”108
In thinking about application of the waterfront takings test to modern cases, a
subject discussed fully in Part III, it is important to keep in mind that, like private
nuisance law, the test is functional, logical, efficient, and fair only to the extent that
neither party can fully rely on prior rights. As Farnham stated, “a little yielding of
absolute right by both interests will permit both to obtain greater benefit.”109
Abandoning the emphasis on prior rights should not strike fear into the hearts of
upland owners and conservatives. First, of course, a return to the traditional
alternative, that is, the rule of absolute sovereign control of submerged lands, would
destroy the value of upland rights altogether by allowing the state to eliminate them
whenever it so desired. Second, as Justice Scalia emphasized in Lucas, atemporal
mechanisms such as private nuisance law have traditionally been fundamental to the

105. Gould v. Hudson River R.R., 6 N.Y. 522, 546 (1852) (noting that vested rights
“remain[] still in and belong[] only to the state”).
106. See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577 (1988) (explaining why the law often adopts muddy rules instead of clearly defining
entitlements).
107. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that an intentional land use constitutes a
private nuisance if “the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). Factors to weigh in assessing harm include
the extent and character of the harm; the social value of the “use or enjoyment invaded” by
the defendant’s activities; “the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality”; and the costs plaintiff would have to incur to avoid suffering harm.
Id. § 827. The “utility of the actor’s conduct,” id. § 826, is a function of the social value of the
defendant’s land use, of “the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality,” and of
the costs to defendant of preventing harm. Id. § 828. Because a locality’s character is
something that can arise only with the passage of time, consideration of character on either
side of the equation results in greater protection for established uses. This is the modern
version of the now defunct defense of “coming to the nuisance.” Even where “coming to the
nuisance” facts do not help the defendant prevail, they might provide the equitable basis for a
court-ordered side payment. See supra note 38.
108. ALLAN BEEVER, THE LAW OF PRIVATE NUISANCE 21 (2013).
109. 1 FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 137.
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definition of property.110 Third, courts and society have recognized the key services
promoted by the waterfront takings test as fundamental for many centuries; where
there is long-standing social consensus regarding fundamental rights used as a
fulcrum in an atemporal test, the results—while perhaps unwelcome to one of the
parties in the case at hand—should not be unsettling or demoralizing to upland
owners generally.111 Finally, the primary purpose of any atemporal
dispute-resolution mechanism, including the waterfront takings test, is to free up
property for economic development.
While it is obvious that conservatives would be unhappy about a return to the
Gould rule—and an unlimited state trump card—it is less obvious why such a rule
would also be detrimental to the interests of environmentalists, hunters, and
fishermen. Part II will make this clear: first, the purpose of the public trust doctrine
is to limit state discretion with respect to trust property to ensure that that property
continues to produce the key services that only that property can produce; second, as
the scope and power of the state’s trump card expand, the power of upland owners
to protect the key services that make their properties so valuable.
II. THE COMMON LAW INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE WATERFRONT TAKINGS TEST
Since 1970, much ink has been spilled on the public trust doctrine.112 Nearly all
of this work explores use of the doctrine as a tool that courts can, should, cannot, or

110. It is possible to read Justice Scalia’s reference in Lucas to private nuisance law as a
“background principle[] of the State’s law of property” as an implicit nod to the concept of
timeless takings. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). After all,
whether a land use constitutes a private nuisance is context dependent. See supra note 107.
Given context dependence, one would be hard pressed to describe a right eliminated by a law
meant to curb a private nuisance as vested.
The use of a timeless approach is also consistent with the traditional notion that each parcel
of real property is unique. An excellent example of how the law expresses this concept is the
availability of specific performance as a remedy for breach of a real estate sales contract.
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 521 (3d ed. 2010) (“[L]and is unique and money is not
likely to be an adequate substitute for conveyance of title.”); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE
A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.5 (3d ed. 2000). That such a view is traditional is
evidenced by features of English common law, such as the doctrine of ameliorative waste that
aimed to ensure that future generations would inherit exactly what their predecessors had
owned. See 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 19.08 (David A Thomas, N. Gregory Smith,
eds., 3d ed. 2014).
111. As Carol Rose notes, superficially muddier rules can be more predictable than
crystalline rules, especially when muddy rules incorporate “socially understood conventions”
and apply to disputes among “persons with some common understanding.” Rose, supra note
106, at 609. This is likely the case with respect to oceanfront property, given its cultural
importance and the fairly consistent legal treatment of waterways and shores over many
millennia. See Richard Perruso, The Development of the Doctrine of Res Communes in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe, 70 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 69, 70–75
(2002) (explaining Roman law as it pertains to coastal property).
112. In a 1970 article, Joseph Sax revived discussion of the public trust doctrine after
seventy-five years of scholarly neglect. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
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should not use to protect the environment.113 The doctrine has rarely been framed as
a set of property rules defining states’ rights to use and enjoy, exclude, and alienate
trust property.114 Although Stop the Beach Renourishment boosted interest in the
doctrine of private upland rights, it has received much less scholarly attention than
its public counterpart.115 Moreover, there are few articles that examine the
relationship between upland rights and the public trust doctrine or attempt to weave
them into a coherent set of rules for legal coastline property.116
This Part focuses on important aspects of the two doctrines that prior literature
has ignored. It presents the public trust doctrine as a set of rules that define the state’s
rights and responsibilities as a property owner;117 it provides a modern,
comprehensive view of the oceanfront owner’s core and upland rights; it illustrates
how the property rules that make up the public trust doctrine are meant not only to
protect the public interest, but also—and to an even greater degree—the property
rights of oceanfront owners; and, finally, it explains how the opposite is also true:
that is, how upland rights both protect and serve the interests of the public.118

113. See Thompson, supra note 48, at 48 nn.1–2.
114. Those authors who do focus on the relationship between the public trust doctrine and
property law do so in a way that frames the doctrine primarily as a takings defense. See, e.g.,
John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in Takings
Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931 (2012); James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause
Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work,
3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987).
115. Most commentary on Stop the Beach Renourishment is on the judicial takings cause
of action. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L.
REV. 903 (2011); Josh Patashnik, Note, Bringing a Judicial Takings Claim, 64 STAN. L. REV.
255 (2012). Those authors who focus on upland rights do so within the context of the case.
See, e.g., Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries, and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
19 (2009); Mary Doyle & Stephen J. Schnably, Going Rogue: Stop the Beach Renourishment
as an Object of Morbid Fascination, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 83 (2012); Richard A. Epstein, Littoral
Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011).
116. These articles tend to focus on consumptive water rights. See, e.g., Michael C.
Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649 (2010); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters,
19 ENVTL. L. 473 (1989).
117. James Huffman has argued for interpretation of the public trust doctrine as a pure rule
of property. His views of the property interests involved and of approaches to reconciling those
interests with the rights of upland owners are much narrower than those presented here. See
James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989); Huffman, supra note 114.
118. Because the two doctrines are largely matters of state law, rules are not uniform across
all coastal states. The general concepts, however, are consistent; cases where significant
deviations exist will be noted. The treatment here centers on the law as it pertains to oceanfront
property. Both doctrines apply to land adjacent to and under all public waterways. There are
certain aspects of the law, particularly as it relates to the consumptive use of fresh water, that
raise issues beyond the scope of this paper.
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A. States’ Property Rights
1. What States Own
The original thirteen states took title to submerged lands that King George III had
owned prior to the revolution.119 Under English common law, the public trust
doctrine covered lands beneath waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; the
catalog of protected public uses of trust areas included only navigation, commerce,
and fishing.120 At the moment of statehood, each of the thirty-seven later-admitted
states received title to submerged lands within their boundaries held by the federal
government.121 Later-admitted states obtained title to these lands on the basis of the
equal footing doctrine—each state is entitled to begin its journey as a state with the
same basic rights and privileges.122
In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the English
courts had simply used “the ebb and flow of the tide” as a convenient test for
determining which waterways were “public navigable waters.”123 Because the
primary purpose of the doctrine was to protect the public’s interest in navigation, and
because many navigable waterways in the United States were not ebb-and-flow
waters, the Court held that the American version of the public trust included lands
beneath navigable rivers and lakes.124
Because the case at hand involved a dispute over the submerged lands beneath
Lake Michigan, the Court did not address the issue of whether, after its ruling, the
ebb-and-flow test had any continued import; that is, whether the American version
of the doctrine gave states ownership of lands beneath all ebb-and-flow waters, even
if they were nonnavigable. Given the Court’s rationale for including lands beneath
navigable rivers and lakes within the public trust, it is reasonable to infer that the
Court would similarly have found lands beneath navigable ebb-and-flow waters,
such as the open ocean, to be within the trust. What was less clear was whether states
continued to hold title to lands such as shallow marshlands, which lay beneath
nonnavigable, ebb-and-flow waters.
After a long hiatus, the Court finally found occasion to resolve this uncertainty in
the late 1980s. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,125 the plaintiff claimed the
right to extract oil from tidally influenced, nonnavigable-in-fact wetlands by virtue
of leases it had entered into with private parties claiming to hold title to those lands.

119. See Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 439–40.
120. Id. at 447, 465. For discussion of confusion surrounding the equal footing doctrine
and submerged lands, see John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR
L. REV. 519 (1951); James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 30–62 (1997).
121. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 474 (1988). The United States,
or another prior sovereign owner, for example, Spain, may have transferred title to some of
the submerged lands within a state’s boundaries prior to statehood. Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 50–51 (1894).
122. Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 444.
123. 146 U.S. 387, 435–36 (1892).
124. Id. at 436.
125. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
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The State of Mississippi argued that those private parties did not, and had not ever,
owned the lands leased to the plaintiff.126 In answering the question left open by
Illinois Central, the Court held that, in denominating navigable, nontidal waters as
state trust property, Illinois Central did not “simultaneously withdraw[] from public
trust coverage” ebb-and-flow submerged lands.127
Another important physical scope issue relates to the specific location of the legal
coastline, that is, the line marking the landward extent of state trust lands. The
location of the line is a matter of state law.128 Twenty-two of twenty-three
ocean-bordering states use averages of tidal datums to determine their legal
coastlines.129
In states that use datums, such as the mean high-tide line (MHTL), identifying the
exact location of the legal coastline is a two-step process. The first step, marking the
MHTL, is beyond the realm of a layman. It requires a surveyor armed with
information about the height of an imaginary horizontal plane (representing “‘the
average height of all the high waters at that place over a considerable period of time,’
. . . there should be ‘a periodic variation in the rise of water above sea level having a
period of 18.6 years’”130) to connect that plane with enough specific points on the
beach to generate an estimate of the MHTL. Despite the need for a trained
professional, the MHTL is an objective fact: it is a function of the horizontal
water-level plane and the physical profile of the beach.131

126. Id. at 472.
127. Id. at 479.
128. Again, the exception to this general rule is that federal common law governs where
title can be traced back to a federal patent. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10,
22 (1935). Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, it is past time for
the Court to overturn the “federal patent rule.” For an explanation, see Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294–95 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Charles E.
Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, and to What Extent Is This a Federal Question, 42
WASH. L. REV. 33 (1966).
129. See STEACY DOPP HICKS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING TIDES 56 (2006), available at http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov
/publications/Understanding_Tides_by_Steacy_finalFINAL11_30.pdf [https://perma.cc/R88E
-4NP6]. “A datum is a reference from which linear measurements are made. It can be a
physical point, line, or plane. It can also be an invisible point, line, or plane positioned by a
statistical treatment of the numerical values of a particular natural phenomenon.” Id. at 51.
The twenty-third, Hawaii, uses a very different approach. Hawaii uses the “highest reach
of the highest wash of the waves,” which is marked by the debris line or the seaward extent
of vegetation. Diamond v. State, 145 P.3d 704, 716 (Haw. 2006); see also HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 205A-1 (2008).
130. Borax, 296 U.S. at 26–27 (quoting H. A. MARMER, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
COAST & GEODETIC SURVEY, TIDAL DATUM PLANES 76, 81 (1927)).
131. An agency of the federal government, the National Geodetic Survey (formerly the
U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey), recalculates various tidal measurements, including mean
high tides, about every twenty to twenty-five years. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TIDAL DATUMS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 14 (2000), available at
http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/tidal_datums_and_their_applications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82AS-QMPR]. The process involves averaging data collected through one
Metonic cycle. “The Metonic cycle . . . is named after the Greek astronomer Meton who
observed that 19 solar years, approximately, are equal to 235 lunar months.” R. Newton
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Locating the legal coastline, which can diverge from the MHTL, requires
objective knowledge of state law as well as subjective judgments about legal facts.
The legal coastline might be different from the MHTL for two reasons. In most states,
when the beach profile is altered either by sudden “avulsive” events, such as a storm,
or by artificial accretions, such as those that might be caused by groins or jetties, the
MHTL moves, but the legal coastline does not.132 So, marking an accurate boundary
requires knowledge of whether the state in which the property is located has special
rules for either avulsive or artificially induced change and, if so, a determination as
to whether alterations to the beach profile are the result of sudden events or
nonnatural structures or actions. Whether a change is sudden or gradual is not a
question for surveyors; rather, it is a legal distinction that can only finally be made
by a court of law.133

Mayall, Betwixt and Between Dates, 82 SCI. MONTHLY 210, 210 (1956). The significance of
this correlation is that it provides a logical period, or epoch, for averaging tidal events such as
high tides.
These nineteen-year averages are then used to locate points along the coast at which the
mean high-tide plane intersects with land. The agency determines exact locations for selected
points; other points along the line are extrapolated using computer models. U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra, at 14.
132. Accreted land is dry land added to an upland parcel caused by the slow attachment of
sediment, “by small and imperceptible degrees.” Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150,
156 (1855). The opposite of accretion is erosion, the slow disappearance of sediment. Slow
increases or decreases in the amount of dry land can also occur from “reliction,” a decrease in
water levels, or from a rise in water levels. EAGLE, supra note 2, at 13. In many, but not all
states, the law distinguishes between these slow forms of change and rapid forms of change:
where change occurs slowly, the legal coastline moves with the water line; where it occurs
rapidly, the legal coastline remains where it was prior to the event. Compared with the legal
vocabulary of slow change, the lexicon of rapid change is impoverished. All rapid change is
generally known as “avulsion.” Id. In this Article, I use the terms “negative avulsion” and
“positive avulsion” to distinguish between rapid landward and seaward change, respectively.
See also Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future
Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010); Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams,
Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1957, 1969 (2013).
For more on rules pertaining to artificial accretion, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, Boundaries
Along a Waterbody, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed.,
2012). Admittedly, these rules are far more complicated than I describe. So, for example, states
might move the MHTL, giving title to accreted land to the upland owner where the artificial
accretion is caused by a third party, but where it is a result of the owner’s actions. See Brundage
v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123, 128 (Ill. 1917). Or, states might distinguish between artificial accretion
caused by “human activities . . . in the immediate vicinity of the accreted land.” State ex rel.
State Lands Comm’n v. Superior Court, 900 P.2d 648, 665–66 (Cal. 1995). For a description
of the ways in which states do and do not treat avulsive events differently from gradual change,
see Dellapenna, supra.
133. For a complete discussion of the problems in distinguishing avulsive events from
erosion and accretion, see generally Sax, supra note 132. The difficulty in determining whether
accretion or erosion has been caused by natural or artificial forces is illustrated by cases such
as Superior Court of Sacramento County, 900 P.2d 648. For a surveyor’s description of the
process of locating legal coastlines, see George M. Cole, Tidal Water Boundaries, 20 STETSON
L. REV. 165 (1990). See also BRUCE S. FLUSHMAN, WATER BOUNDARIES: DEMYSTIFYING LAND
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2. The Right To Alienate
The state’s property rights with respect to trust lands are shaped to a large extent
by a restriction on its right to alienate. The origins of the public trust doctrine can be
traced to a single sentence in Chapter 33 of the Magna Carta: “All kydells [weirs] for
the future shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and throughout
all England, except upon the seashore.”134 Weirs are nets installed on a fixed set of
pilings arranged perpendicular to the banks of a river or coastline; they were, and
still are, used to catch schools of fish as they migrate up or down a river or along the
coast.135
English courts interpreted Chapter 33 broadly to prevent the sovereign from
alienating, or “disposing,” property interests in royally owned submerged lands136—if
such disposals would interfere with key services provided by the waters above, such
as navigation, commerce, and fishing.137 So, for example, a royal grant of rights to
install fish weirs would be a prohibited disposal because private rights to install and
use weirs would interfere with the public’s ability to access all three of these services:
weirs would interfere with public fishing because they would prevent fish from
passing upstream and down; they would interfere with navigation because vessels
cannot pass across or through weirs; and they would interfere with commerce
because they would allow one party privileged access to the public resource.
In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,138 the “lodestar” U.S. Supreme Court
opinion on the public trust doctrine,139 American courts identified the key issue in

BOUNDARIES ADJACENT TO TIDAL OR NAVIGABLE WATERS (2002).
134. The Public Trust Doctrine in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 766 (1970).
135. D.J. Pannett, Fish Weirs of the River Severn, 26 FOLK LIFE 54 (1987).
136. See The Public Trust Doctrine in Tidal Areas, supra note 134, at 766.
137. “[T]he King has the property, but ‘the people have the necessary use.’” THE READING
OF THE FAMOUS AND LEARNED ROBERT CALLIS, ESQ. UPON THE STATUTE OF SEWERS, 23 HEN.
VIII. C.5, at 67 (William John Broderip ed., 4th ed. 1824) (1622) (translated from Latin). As
discussed below, English courts would allow the sovereign to make such disposals with the
approval of Parliament.
At the time of American independence, English common law recognized only navigation,
commerce, and fishing. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 58 (describing the traditional
trust purposes derived from English common law). Today, twenty-seven states recognize
recreational use as a service protected by the public trust doctrine. Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property
Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private
Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010).
138. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
139. Sax, supra note 112, at 489; see State v. Superior Court of Lake Cnty., 625 P.2d 239,
249 (Cal. 1981) (describing Illinois Central as the “seminal case on the scope of the public
trust doctrine” (quoting City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 606 P.2d 362,
365 (Cal. 1980))); see also CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska
1988); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 439–40 (Haw. 2000); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983); Bos.
Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 365–66 (Mass. 1979); Glass v.
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“duty not to dispose” cases as the effect that the transfer of submerged lands has on
a key-service provision.140 The effect does not have to be physical. In Illinois Central,
for example, the state transferred title to submerged lands to a railroad company that
intended to develop an extensive wharf system on those lands.141 The state grant
documents explicitly retained navigation rights for the public.142 Although the Court
ultimately held that the state had violated its duty not to dispose, it did not do so on
the ground that the wharves would result in too much physical interference with
public rights. Rather, the concern was that the transfer would, by granting the railroad
an effective monopoly over the transshipment of goods in Chicago Harbor, interfere
with the trust service of “commerce”—the public would lose its freedom to choose
among wharf facilities as well as the economic benefits associated with competition
among those facilities.143
In later cases, courts have applied the duty not to dispose to state actions beyond
the actual transfer or use of submerged lands. So, for example, in National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,144 the Supreme Court of California held
that withdrawal permits issued by the state’s water agency might have violated the
duty not to dispose because the withdrawals would, by decreasing water levels in
Mono Lake, diminish trust services provided by the lake.145 Although it is possible
to read the case as a case of literal disposal (as water levels in the lake declined, the
owners of land bordering on the lake might be able to take title to formerly
submerged lands under rules covering slow, imperceptible relictions), the court does
not present the case in this way.146
In Illinois Central, the majority noted some exceptions to states’ “duty not to
dispose”:
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment
of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. . . . In the

Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 88 (Mich. 2005) (citing People v. Silberwood, 67 N.W. 1087, 1087
(Mich. 1896)); Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 609 (Nev. 2011); State v. Cent. Vt.
Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Vt. 1989).
Although the Illinois Central opinion is not clear on the point, most states have interpreted
the holdings of Illinois Central as federal law. See Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 453–56. But
see Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674, 683 n.5 (N.C. 1995) (noting Illinois Central “did not
involve North Carolina law”).
140. I use the term “duty not to dispose” to refer to the public trust doctrine’s restriction
on alienation. See EAGLE, supra note 2, at 194–232.
141. 146 U.S. at 433–34.
142. Id. at 444.
143. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 924–25 (2004).
144. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).
145. Id. at 721 (“We conclude that the public trust doctrine, as recognized and developed
in California decisions, protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of
nonnavigable tributaries.”).
146. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of such “indirect disposals” and the controversy
surrounding this interpretation of the duty not to dispose.

2016]

TAKING THE OCEANFRONT LOT

877

administration of government the use of such powers may for a limited
period be delegated to a municipality or other body, but there always
remains with the State the right to revoke those powers and exercise them
in a more direct manner, and one more conformable to its wishes. So
with trusts connected with public property, or property of a special
character, like lands under navigable waters, they cannot be placed
entirely beyond the direction and control of the State.147
State courts have widely adopted the first two exceptions, allowing the state to
make disposals that either enhance trust uses or do not substantially impair them.148
The first exception would allow a state to transfer trust lands in perpetuity to, for
example, an upland owner who wished to build a commercial wharf or a recreational
marina. The idea is that both the wharf and the marina would enhance the trust use
of navigation by providing the public with places to land their vessels. In addition,
the wharf would facilitate the trust use of commerce by reducing the costs related to
the offloading of goods and people. The second exception is slightly more opaque;
echoing the problems expressed by the dissent in Illinois Central, courts have had a
more difficult time deciding what size of transfer constitutes a “substantial
impairment” and what size does not.149
The third, and less frequently discussed, exception to the duty not to dispose might
be called the “recourse” exception. Implicit in the language cited above, and in
language elsewhere in the Illinois Central opinion, is the idea that transfers of trust
property are problematic only to the extent that they place the provision of key
services “entirely beyond [state] direction and control.”150 So, for example, the
doctrine would allow a transfer of limited temporal duration, such as a revocable
license or a lease—even if it did not serve a public purpose and resulted in substantial
impairment—because the “State [reserved] the right to revoke those powers and
exercise them in a more direct manner.”151

147. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453–54 (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., State v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203, 1211 (Alaska 2010); State
ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. Superior Court, 900 P.2d 648, 655 (Cal. 1995); Boone v.
Kingsbury, 273 P. 797, 812 (Cal. 1928); Superior Pub. Rights, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Natural
Res., 263 N.W.2d 290, 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
149. As Justice Shiras wrote:
The opinion of the majority, if I rightly apprehend it, likewise concedes that a
State does possess the power to grant the rights of property and possession in
such lands to private parties, but the power is stated to be, in some way restricted
to “small parcels, or where such parcels can be disposed of without detriment to
the public interests in the lands and waters remaining.” But it is difficult to see
how the validity of the exercise of the power, if the power exists, can depend
upon the size of the parcel granted, or how, if it be possible to imagine that the
power is subject to such a limitation, the present case would be affected, as the
grant in question, though doubtless a large and valuable one, is, relatively to the
remaining soil and waters, if not insignificant, yet certainly, in view of the
purposes to be effected, not unreasonable.
146 U.S. at 467 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 454.
151. Id. at 453–54.
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3. The Right To Exclude
Because a guarantee of public access to key services such as navigation,
commerce, and fishing is at the heart of the public trust doctrine, a right to exclude
the public from trust property is counterintuitive. Courts have recognized, however,
that unlimited access to those services can jeopardize the state’s ability to maximize
short- and long-term value.152 As the number of people on a beach increases, for
example, there will be a point at which the summed benefits begin to decrease.153
Too much fishing will result not only in short-term losses but in long-term damage
as well.154 In addition, courts have also recognized that not all trust uses are
compatible with one another.155 So, the state might exclude one sector of the
public—jet skiers—if it wishes to ensure the ability of a given area to provide
opportunities for forms of recreation that require a quieter environment.156
4. The Right To Use and Enjoy
Limits on the state’s rights to use and enjoy trust property are derivative of the
restriction on disposals. If the goal of the doctrine is to ensure continued public access
to key services, then the doctrine must prevent the state from using trust property in
ways that interfere, in the same way disposals would, with access to those services.
In other words, the doctrine regulates “self-disposals” just as it regulates disposals.157
A contrary rule would allow the state to circumvent the duty not to dispose.
Imagine that a state legislature was interested in transferring a large tract of
submerged land to a private party interested in developing the property for residential
housing. A straight transfer of the property to the developer would violate the duty

152. See Ventura Cnty. Commercial Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Cal. Fish & Game Comm’n, No.
B166335, 2004 WL 293565 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004) (holding that the State closure of
certain ocean areas to fishing supported by need to protect fish populations from overuse).
153. See M.C. De Ruyck, Alexandre G. Soares & Anton McLachlan, Social Carrying
Capacity as a Management Tool for Sandy Beaches, 13 J. COASTAL RES. 822 (1997).
154. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF FISH STOCK REBUILDING PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2014).
155. Carstens v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 135, 143 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he
public trust doctrine . . . does not prevent the state from preferring one trust use over another.”).
156. Weden v. San Juan Cnty., 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (upholding county
ban on the use of personal watercraft for navigation because of their impacts on other trust
uses, namely quiet recreation such as wildlife viewing).
157. Although the “duty not to dispose” cases dominate the record of public trust litigation,
there are also many public trust doctrine cases challenging the state’s use of property as outside
the scope of the public trust doctrine. Illustrating the close relationship between the public
trust and upland rights doctrines, the issue often arises in upland owners’ suits seeking
compensation for interference with upland rights. Recall that, under the waterfront takings
test, the state has no liability where it is using submerged lands for trust purposes; thus, upland
owners’ first argument is often that the interfering state use is outside the scope of the trust.
So, for example, in Colberg, Inc. v. State, 432 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1967), the State of California built
two bridges that allegedly interfered with the plaintiff’s right of access. These cases provide
evidence of the important role that upland owners can play in enforcing the public trust
doctrine. See infra Part II.C.
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not to dispose and would not fall within any exceptions.158 It would not be consistent
with the goals of the doctrine to allow the state to fill the area, then transfer the newly
filled land to the developer. The most coherent approach is to look at all state
actions—whether transfer, state use, or permitting private activity—as potential
disposals, and to weigh them under the duty not to dispose.
B. Upland Owners’ Property Rights
If trust property is an asset, and the services provided by that property are
dividends and members of the public are shareholders, then the upland owner is a
preferred shareholder. The upland owner has rights in key services that are both
different from and superior to the rights of other members of the public. The upland
owner also derives greater benefit from these services than the average citizen
because they increase the value of her private property.
1. Upland Rights
As described above, the owner of an oceanfront lot possesses two types of rights:
upland rights and standard property rights such as the rights to exclude, use and
enjoy, and alienate. The two types of rights, however, cannot neatly be separated;
upland rights might make the most sense when viewed as defined components of the
owner’s right to use and enjoy. Each of the three most significant upland rights held
by the oceanfront owner—the right of access, the right to wharf out, and the right to
accretions—is meant to protect her access to the key services provided by the
adjacent public waterway.159
From a historical perspective, it appears that the common law established rights
such as the right of access not only as a means of enhancing the value of key services,
but also as a way to clarify that the upland owner’s right to use and enjoy included
rights to limit its neighbor the state’s right to use and enjoy. In other words, upland
rights represent the clarification of entitlements in pursuit of more efficient dispute
prevention and resolution vis-à-vis the state.160

158. There is no reason to believe that states could not make use of the de minimis, or no
substantial impairment, exception to Illinois Central in this context. Whether a state use fits
within this exception requires a subjective judgment. Courts might look at the absolute amount
of the acreage used or at the impact of the use on provision of trust services. Cf. Cnty. of
Orange v. Heim, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1973) (striking down attempted trade of trust
lands for private lands, even though there was little net loss of acreage, because the state lands
provided two-thirds of public access to Newport Bay).
159. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 445–46 (1892) (citing Yates v. Milwaukee,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1871)); see also Schramm v. Spottswood, 109 So. 3d 154, 161
(Ala. 2012); State v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203, 1211–12 (Alaska 2010); Port
Clinton Assocs. v. Bd. of Selectmen, 587 A.2d 126, 132 (Conn. 1991); Nedtweg v. Wallace,
208 N.W. 51, 52–53 (Mich. 1926); Sherwin v. Bitzer 106 N.W. 1046, 1048 (Minn. 1906); St.
Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co. v. St. Louis Union Stock-Yard Co., 25 S.W. 399, 401 (Mo. 1894);
Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 615 (Nev. 2011); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984); Town of N. Hempstead v. Gregory, 65 N.Y.S. 867, 868
(App. Div. 1900).
160. This clarification of state/upland rights might be called “coastal Coase,” because it
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Courts attempting to apply a diminution-based takings approach to interference
with upland rights will necessarily struggle with identifying what an upland owner’s
prior rights were. For example, under the common law, the public trust doctrine
allows states to eliminate upland rights without compensating the upland owner if
the state action eliminating the rights is necessary to protect trust services. At the
same time, in the absence of such necessity, the state cannot eliminate the rights
without compensation. Because of the unique relationship with the state, and because
the exercise of upland rights requires the use of trust lands, upland rights are a very
unproperty-like form of property.
a. Pure Access
The right of pure access, usually simply called the right of access, is the right of
the oceanfront owner to travel unimpeded from her lot to the public waterway. As
owner of the adjacent submerged lands, the state is the only party that can impede
travel; it can do that through self- or third-party disposal of those lands.
The state might interfere with travel by, for example, building a highway along
the coast. The highway, or the pilings on which it is constructed, might prevent the
upland owner from physically reaching the public waterway. If the pilings are tall
enough, the upland owner could still reach the waterway, but her path would be partly
impeded.161 The state could also interfere with travel by transferring full or partial
rights in its property to a third party.162 As noted above, the classic pure access
litigation from the nineteenth and early twentieth century involved state transfers of
easements to railroad companies that found it easier and cheaper to buy one easement
from the state than to acquire hundreds of easements from private landowners.163
Thus, the target of the right of pure access is the state. It is possible that a private
party might interfere with access, but this would occur only if the state has authorized
that interference or if the private party violates the terms of its deed from the state.164
The right of pure access is best viewed as akin to a negative easement, albeit, as
discussed further below, a contingent one: the upland owner can prevent the state
from disposals that interfere unreasonably with her right to travel onto state property,
unless the state’s actions are directed at enhancing the provision of a key service.
b. The Right To Wharf Out
Throughout much of history, the most important key services related to
navigability.165 Thus, for an upland owner to have access to those services, she would

establishes a property-based framework for resolving disputes. See generally R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
161. In Florida, the landowner would have an additional claim: Florida is unique in
recognizing an upland right to an unobstructed view of the public waterway. Bd. of Trs. of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987);
see also Eric Biber, Case Note, A House with a View, 109 YALE L.J. 849 (2000).
162. See Rumsey v. N.Y. & New Eng. R.R., 30 N.E. 654 (N.Y. 1892).
163. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
164. In other words, the trust lands transferee steps into the shoes of the state.
165. Navigation, commerce, and fishing all rely on movement by means of navigable waters.
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need more than pure access; she would need the means to connect to the navigable
channel. If the adjacent trust lands were shallow, densely populated with sea grasses,
or otherwise nonnavigable, then the upland owner would have pure access, but would
lack access that mattered. Unlike the right of pure access, which is effectively a
negative easement over the adjoining trust land, the construction of wharf extending
seaward of the legal coastline would require that the upland owner possess an
affirmative easement: a right to build and maintain a structure indefinitely on
adjoining trust property.
In terms of enforceable rights, the American right to wharf out has three component
parts, two of which target state action. First, the upland owner holds an affirmative
easement over the adjoining state property: the right to build a structure in order to
connect with the navigable channel.166 Second, the upland owner holds a negative
easement that burdens that same property: the right to prevent the state from
authorizing a third party to construct a wharf there.167 Interestingly, the first right—the
actual right to wharf out—is more contingent than the second.168 The state is entitled
to deny the upland owner the right to wharf out where the structure would interfere
with the provision of key services.169 The state is not entitled to allow a third party
to construct a wharf seaward of an upland owner’s property under any
circumstances.170 Unlike the right of pure access, the right to wharf out not only
targets the state, but also targets neighboring upland owners. Where the shoreline is
irregular (imagine a cove), each upland owner is entitled to wharf out; thus, one
upland owner may not build a structure that prevents another from building her
own.171
There are several examples of the ways in which courts and legislatures have
modified the right to wharf out in response to changed understanding or valuation of
a key-service provision. First, it was common in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries for states to allow upland owners to wharf out by filling in adjacent state
lands out to the navigable channel.172 Second, prior to the last half-century, the state

166. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 6 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 6.01(a)(2) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed., 2012).
167. See Wicks v. Howard, 388 A.2d 1250 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
168. A negative easement violates sovereign power less than an affirmative easement.
169. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 445–46 (1892) (“[T]he right must
be understood as terminating at the point of navigability, where the necessity for such
erections ordinarily ceased.”); Krieter v. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111, 112–13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (upholding denial of permit to wharf out because the wharf would be built in a state
marine park).
170. See, e.g., McGibney v. Waucoma Yacht Club, Inc., 182 A.2d 622, 623–24 (Conn.
1962) (citing Shorehaven Golf Club, Inc. v. Water Res. Comm’n, 153 A.2d 444, 446–47
(Conn. 1959)); Rochester v. Barney, 169 A. 45, 47–48 (Conn. 1933); State v. Sargent & Co.,
45 Conn. 358, 373 (1877); Owen v. Hubbard, 271 A.2d 672, 678–80 (Md. 1970) (citing
Causey v. Gray, 243 A.2d 575, 581 (Md. 1968)); City of Baltimore v. Balt. & Phila. Steamboat
Co., 65 A. 353, 358 (Md. 1906); Mayor of Balt. v. St. Agnes Hosp., 48 Md. 419, 420–21
(1878); Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, 36 (1875); Dugan v. Mayor of Balt., 5 G. &
J. 357, 367–68 (Md. 1833).
171. Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1260 (R.I. 1999) (citing
Nugent v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I. 1960)); see Wicks, 388 A.2d at 1253–54.
172. See, e.g., Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 800 (Fla. 1957) (describing Florida
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claimed that the proposed structure would interfere with navigation as its primary
basis for rejecting applications to wharf out. In recent years, states have frequently
rejected applications on the grounds that structures would be harmful to marine life,
that is, would interfere with the key service of recreation.173 Along the same lines,
many states have eliminated the right to wharf out from oceanfront property
altogether.174
c. The Right to Accretions
Perhaps the oldest property law problem in the coastal law arena is the issue of
how to reassign ownership rights after the waterline moves.175 The two options are a
mobile and immobile boundary. The mobile, or migrating, boundary allows upland
lots and trust lands to grow or shrink in area as land is added or subtracted or as water
levels rise or decrease. An immobile boundary does not distinguish lands by their
physical characteristics. As land is added or water levels decrease, the state would
acquire title to those newly formed uplands; in the opposite scenario, the upland
owner would acquire title to the newly submerged land.176
English law applied both rules, depending on the facts. Where the addition or
subtraction of land, or changes in water level, was slow and imperceptible, the
mobile-boundary rule governed. On the other hand, avulsive events—changes that
were not slow and imperceptible—did not move the boundary.177
For the most part, American state courts have adopted what Professor Sax calls
“the accretion/avulsion distinction.”178 In property rights terms, both the upland
owner and the state have the right to a migratory boundary when change is slow and
imperceptible.179 As evidenced by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Stop the

statutes allowing filling of state lands out to the navigable channel). This use of trust lands,
which now seems preposterous to most who read about it, was common and generally accepted
throughout the United States through the first half of the twentieth century. Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(a)(7)
(Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed., 2012). According to this treatise, some state statutes still permit
it, although it would, of course, be subject to federal permission. Id. at 6-61 n.266.
173. See Krieter, 595 So. 2d at 112–13. Protecting marine life is connected to both the
traditional key service of fishing and the more modern key service of recreation. Many members
of the public enjoy nonconsumptive use of marine life, for example, wildlife viewing.
174. See, e.g., Joseph J. Kalo, North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public Waters and
Beaches: The Rights of Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First Century, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1427,
1499 (2005).
175. See generally Sax, supra note 132 (describing the legal issues surrounding accretion
and avulsion); Wyman & Williams, supra note 132 (same).
176. See generally Sax, supra note 132 (describing the legal issues surrounding accretion
and avulsion); Wyman & Williams, supra note 132 (same).
177. See generally Sax, supra note 132 (describing the legal issues surrounding accretion
and avulsion); Wyman & Williams, supra note 132 (same).
178. Sax, supra note 132, at 306. There are notable exceptions, namely Texas, which
applies the mobile boundary rule to all coastal change. Severance v. Patterson, 345 S.W.3d
18, 32 (Tex. 2010).
179. See United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1186 (9th Cir. 2009); Shell Island
Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 417 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
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Beach Renourishment,180 at least some state courts view the right to accretion as a
purely contingent right: that is, the right does not vest until the size of the oceanfront
lots actually increases.181
In the negative avulsion scenario, where natural forces have rapidly shrunk the
area of the oceanfront lot, the common law holds that the upland owner possesses a
“right of reclamation.”182 This common law right gives the upland owner a
reasonable period of time to fill in the avulsively submerged former upland, that is,
to reclaim her property.183
The trend in American law is to favor migrating boundaries over immobile
ones.184 The rationale supporting this trend is consistent with the overall flavor of
upland rights, that is, the maintenance of special access privileges. The migratory
boundary helps to preserve the upland owner’s connection to the water by ensuring
that the legal coastline is almost always identical to the land/water interface.185
2. Core rights
As Professor Sax has argued:
Property does not exist in isolation. Particular parcels are tied to one
another in complex ways, and property is more accurately described as
being inextricably part of a network of relationships that is neither
limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which
the legal system is accustomed to dealing. Frequently, use of any given
parcel of property is at the same time effectively a use of, or a demand
upon, property beyond the border of the user.186
The oceanfront lot illustrates this proposition well. Its owner both benefits from,
and is limited by, the fact that the state is her next-door neighbor and, importantly,
that the public trust doctrine requires the state to maintain key services. The special
benefits of ownership are incorporated into the upland rights doctrine while the
burdens take the form of limitations on core rights. As Farnham wrote: “[t]he rights

180. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1115 (Fla. 2008).
181. See id. at 1118–22.
182. See, e.g., Phila. Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 623 (1912); Beach Colony II v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 199 Cal. Rptr. 195, 202 (Ct. App. 1984).
183. Phila. Co., 223 U.S. at 623; Beach Colony II, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 202. The cases are
unclear as to how long this right endures following the avulsive event. In addition, federal
laws, specifically Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 403 (2012), and Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), could
make it difficult or impossible for the upland owner to act on the common law right, despite
the fact that she owns title to the underlying land.
184. See generally Sax, supra note 132 (describing the legal issues surrounding accretion
and avulsion).
185. Id. For an explanation of why I say “almost always,” see supra notes 143–144 and
accompanying text.
186. Sax, supra note 6, at 152.
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may be said to be reciprocal, each modifying the other, each to be used so as not to
interfere unreasonably with the other right.”187
a. The Right To Alienate
The upland owner is not free to transfer upland rights to a third party.188 In other
words, the law requires that ownership of the oceanfront lot and the appurtenant
upland rights remain in common ownership. This rule reinforces the notion that
economic development is the rationale underlying both the upland rights and public
trust doctrines: segregating upland rights from the oceanfront land would open the
door to future coordination problems that could decrease the provision of key
services.189
b. The Right To Exclude
In certain cases, for example, where the property includes sandy beach prone to
frequent change in a state using a datum-based system for locating the legal coastline,
the oceanfront lot owner’s right to exclude—along the seaward boundary of the
property—is as a practical matter very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.190 In
states that distinguish between accretion and avulsion, between artificial and natural
accretion, or both, location of the legal coastline becomes even more difficult:
artificial accretion, like avulsion, results in physical disparity between the MHTL
and the legal coastline. In other words, identification of the boundary would require
a surveyor and a quiet title action.
How far landward does this area of nonexcludability extend? Sax has described a
“zone [on the seashore] that is neither wholly public nor wholly private.”191 Of
course, the upland owner must have an enforceable seaward boundary somewhere
on her property.
Some might object to the idea that one could call the oceanfront lot “property”
under these conditions. However, the fact is that the rule creating the uncertainty of
hindering trespass enforcement is the same rule that ensures that the lot maintains its
connection to the water. Without a mobile and elusive boundary, the oceanfront
owner would bear a constant risk of losing all of her upland rights; any addition of
land, uplift, or reliction would transform the upland owner into an ordinary owner,

187. 1 FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 137–38.
188. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 6 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 6.01(a)(1) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed., 2012).
189. The transfer of upland rights to a third party would defeat efficiency in that it would
create a bilateral monopoly problem between the once-upland owner and the owner of her
former rights in the adjacent trust lands.
190. Trespass law is frequently put forward as an example of a “clear, crystalline rule.”
Rose, supra note 106, at 594; Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13–14 (1985). As cases such as State v.
Ibbison illustrate, however, when both the owner and the public have difficulty locating the
boundary, trespass can only rarely be enforced. 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982) (overturning beach
trespass conviction on due process grounds).
191. Sax, supra note 132, at 356.
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because the state would own the new swath of dry land. Furthermore, the publicness
objected to is the same publicness that makes upland property more valuable than
ordinary property: if the trust lands adjacent to the oceanfront lot were private (or not
open to the public), the owner of the oceanfront lot would not be entitled to walk off
her property at high tide. As Justice Holmes would say, the rule of nonexcludability
from some indefinite dry-sand zone creates “average reciprocity of advantage.”192
c. The Right To Use and Enjoy
The state’s use of its property in furtherance of a key-service provision can limit
activities on the oceanfront lot and, therefore, the oceanfront owner’s ability to
exercise her upland rights. Imagine that a state devotes an area of near-shore trust
lands to an ecological restoration project in order to enhance the key services of
recreation and fishing. This use would impose limits on uses of adjacent uplands that
might generate harmful pollution runoff; it would also make it more likely that the
state would deny her application to wharf out. At the same time, however, by
increasing the ecological quality of the adjacent waters, and by limiting her private
neighbors’ uses, the state project would likely enhance the value of her property.
Another specific, oft-discussed state restriction on the use of upland property is
the rule preventing the upland owner from installing “hard erosion control devices,”
for example, seawalls, riprap, or bulkheads, on her property.193 From the property
owner’s perspective, such bans fundamentally limit her right to use and enjoy her
property by requiring her to submit to forces of nature that threaten to reduce the size
of or eliminate her lot. Courts have thus far upheld state bans on several grounds:
first, that the state is entitled, like the upland owner, to a mobile boundary; and,
second, that the detrimental impacts of such structures on state property, namely the
public beach seaward of the legal coastline, constitute a substantial interference with
public property, that is, a public nuisance.194

192. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
193. See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How To
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279 (1998).
North and South Carolina have adopted bans on new hard structures. 15A N.C. ADMIN.
CODE 7H.0308(a)(1)(B) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(B)(2) (2014).
194. Sams v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 63 A.3d 953, 986 (Conn. 2013) (finding that plaintiff’s
construction of seawall without an approved coastal site plan “constituted a public nuisance”);
Shanahan v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 47 A.3d 364, 365–68 (Conn. 2012) (finding plaintiff who
built seawall waterward of high tide line in violation of Department of Environmental
Protection regulations, considering such violations “a public nuisance for which the
department may issue a cease and desist order”); Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v.
Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff’s takings claim
because erosion and migration are “a consequence of being a riparian or littoral landowner”
and thus does not entitle property owners to erect structures in “statutorily designated areas of
environmental concern to protect their property”).
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C. Cross-Protection: How the Public Trust Doctrine Serves Upland Owners and
How Upland Rights Serve the Public
While it is easy to portray the public trust doctrine as protecting the public’s
interest in state property and the upland rights doctrine as a guardian of private rights,
each of the two doctrines functions to protect the rights of both private owners and
the public.195 “Cross-protection” is consistent with the unique physical and economic
relationship between the two parties. 196

195. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 114, at 174 (finding that the public trust doctrine “pit[s]
private rights against public rights, and to the senior right goes the spoils”); Melissa K.
Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View into the Trustees’ World,
39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 159 (2012) (“Private riparians’ placement of piers illustrates the clash
of riparian rights and public rights in navigable waters.”).
196. There are other locations where private and public property share a common
boundary, for example, at the outskirts of public parks, and along roads and highways. In those
scenarios, the law includes special provisions that define and balance private and public
interests. Courts have established a rule, for example, that the federal government has the right
to use the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution as a form of private nuisance law to restrict
the use of private or state property adjacent to federal lands. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529, 537–38 (1976); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525–26 (1897);
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1248–49 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007
(1982); see also Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property
Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
One can argue that property relationships between the state and businesses regarding public
roads are similar, if not identical, to relationships along the legal coastline. See Sax, supra note
37, at 74–75. In some waterfront cases, courts have made this analogy. See Rumsey v. N.Y,
and New Eng. R.R., 30 N.E. 654, 656 (N.Y. 1892) (“[The] distinction to be made between the
rights which pertain to an owner of land upon a public river and one upon a public street . . .
is not perceived.”) In Judicial Takings, Professor Thompson uses the elevated railway cases
as another set of examples (in addition to beach and water cases) where the protection offered
to a landowner by a judicial takings rule would be particularly important. Thompson, supra
note 36, at 1463–65. In these cases, the state transferred property rights in its roads, in the form
of an easement, to railroad companies for the installation of rail lines. Adjacent landowners
sued the railroad companies, claiming that the “darkness, noise, smoke, dirt, and cinders”
produced by the defendants resulted in a taking of the landowners’ common law negative
easements protecting “light, air, and access.” Id. at 1463. In deciding these cases, the New
York courts referenced some prior waterfront cases, but did not view them as precedential.
Story v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 90 N.Y. 122, 156 (1882) (rejecting the argument that the decision
in Gould was apposite to the dispute at hand).
There are several reasons why the analogy between roads/road-front owners and
waterways/upland owners is not perfect. As a historical matter, the legal traditions pertaining
to waterways are much older than those pertaining to highways. Moreover, Roman and English
law, from which the upland rights and public trust doctrines are derived, treated the latter as
state property and the former as trust property. EAGLE, supra note 2, at 186–93. Even if we
were to consider roads as trust property, the common law did not provide road-front property
owners with a set of named rights vis-à-vis the state along the lines of the rights provided to
the waterfront property owner by the upland rights doctrine. (Interestingly, English and
American common law did restrict certain road-front owners’ right to exclude due to their
status as road-front owners, under the “law of innkeeping.” See Frederic W. Peirsol, Note, An
Innkeeper’s “Right” to Discriminate, 15 FLA. L. REV. 109 (1962). As noted below, this rule
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The public trust doctrine creates value for upland owners. In the traditional
waterfront takings cases, this value came from access to commerce. In the modern
oceanfront takings cases, Hughes, Stevens, Nollan, Lucas, and Stop the Beach
Renourishment, the plaintiffs were all residential homeowners.197 Although
residential property owners are unconcerned with the transshipment of goods, the
value differential between ordinary and oceanfront residential property does depend
upon access (physical and visual) to trust property.198 By limiting development of
trust property and by ensuring its publicness, the public trust doctrine protects the
value of this access.199 The landowner’s right of access guarantees a direct pathway
to the wet-sand beach directly between the residence and the sea; but, it is the
publicness of the wet-sand beach that allows the landowner the ability to walk off of
her property at high tide (in a MHTL state).200 The value of a beachfront home can
also be correlated to the quality of the adjacent trust areas: the width of the beach,201

may have a parallel with respect to beachfront property.) And, while roads are artificial
creations, geographic features such as rivers and oceans (and riverfront and oceanfront land)
are not. Unlike roads and parcels bordering roads, we cannot add to the supply of public
waterways and upland property. One notable exception would be the expansion of the system
of public waterways through improvements, for example, dredging, or the construction of
canals. Such projects can, but do not as a rule, create new public waterways. Compare Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176–78 (1979) (dredging of harbor from existing pond
adjacent to Pacific Ocean does not create a public waterway), with United States v.
Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407, 427–29 (1940) (improvements convert private,
nonnavigable waterway into public waterway). Finally, the often uncertain location of the
boundary between private and state property is a feature unique to waterfront property and
creates a distinctive relationship between the parties. See supra Part II.A.3.
197. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1207 (1994); Hughes v. State, 410 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1966).
198. Okmyung Bin, Thomas W. Crawford, Jaime B. Kruse & Craig E. Landry, Viewscapes
and Flood Hazard: Coastal Housing Market Response to Amenities and Risk, 84 LAND ECON.
434 (2008) (modeling value provided by visual and physical access). Residential buyers in
popular oceanfront communities pay a substantial premium for upland property. In Delaware,
for example, a home on the beach is worth about sixty percent more than a comparably sized
home just 500 feet inland. George R. Parsons & Joëlle Noailly, A Value Capture Property Tax
for Financing Beach Nourishment Projects: An Application to Delaware’s Ocean Beaches, 47
OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 49, 60–61 (2004). This premium exists despite increased risk of
storm damage, higher insurance costs, and very large crowds on the beach throughout the
summer season. (The public has legal access to about sixty-three percent of dry sand beach in
Delaware. BEACHAPEDIA, State of the Beach/State Reports/DE/Beach Access,
http://www.beachapedia.org/State_of_the_Beach/State_Reports/DE/Beach_Access [https://perma.cc
/9VB7-QYCQ] (last modified May 2, 2013)).
199. Rose, supra note 53, at 718 (coining and explaining the term “publicness” in the beach
context).
200. As Professor Rose explains, people value not only the ability to walk on the public
beach, but also the “publicness” of the beach, which allows them to experience the benefits of
social interaction. Id. at 777–81.
201. Sathya Gopalakrishnan, Martin D. Smith, Jordan M. Slott & A. Brad Murray, The
Value of Disappearing Beaches: A Hedonic Pricing Model with Endogenous Beach Width, 61
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pleasant smells,202 unpolluted water,203 and healthy wildlife populations.204 To the
extent that the state abides by its public trust responsibility to maintain key service
provisions, it protects all these sources of private value.
With regard to private rights, the public trust doctrine plays an underappreciated
role in protecting upland owners. Under the Illinois Central exceptions to the duty
not to dispose,205 a state can use or transfer out its trust lands without liability when
the use or transfer is in furtherance of trust purposes. To the extent a state’s courts
(or constitution) define “trust purposes” narrowly, the state will be constrained in its
ability to transfer or use trust lands without payment to upland owners—its zone of
liability-free activity will be smaller. On the other hand, where state courts interpret
“trust purposes” broadly, that zone will be larger, and the state will thus have more
power to destroy upland rights without compensating upland owners.206 Of course, a
broader definition also threatens the public beneficiaries of the trust by freeing the
state to dispose of lands for purposes far afield from the classic navigation,
commerce, fishing, and recreation.207
In a mirrored way, the upland rights doctrine protects public value and public
rights. The value to the public of key services is a function of the quality of those
services and the ease with which the public can access them. As owners of the strip
of land separating the public at large from trust areas, the land-sea interface, upland
owners are in a position to help the state on both fronts. With respect to
navigation-related services, upland owners can provide vital infrastructure and a
competitive market for access. Because their businesses or residential experiences
depend upon the quality of key services, upland owners have an incentive to pressure
the state on issues such as water pollution, fisheries conservation and management,
and navigational improvements.
Upland rights also serve as a back up to the duty not to dispose. If a state makes
a transfer outside the scope of “trust purposes,” and that transfer impacts an upland
owner’s rights, the upland owner can sue for compensation. The threat of such
litigation should dissuade states from making transfers beyond the scope of trust
purposes. If the state goes forward, the upland owner’s lawsuit effectively has two
purposes: to seek compensation for infringement of his rights and to protect the

J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 297, 297 (2011).
202. David McEwen & Philip Wolstoneholm, Pump Station Odor Control in a Tourist
Location, 11 PROC. OF THE WATER ENV’T FED’N 345 (2010).
203. Christopher G. Leggett & Nancy E. Bockstael, Evidence of the Effects of Water
Quality on Residential Land Prices, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 121, 121 (2000).
204. Roy Brouwer, Sebastiaan Hess, Yi Liu, Pieter van Beukering & Sonia Garcia, A
Hedonic Price Model of Coral Reef Quality in Hawaii, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
NON-MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION 37, 55 (Jeff Bennett ed., 2011).
205. See supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text.
206. See Colberg, Inc. v. State, 432 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1967) (en banc); Morgan & Lewis,
supra note 48, at 533. Under the test, a state can transfer trust property without liability to the
owner of adjacent uplands if the transfer is in furtherance of trust purposes or if the transfer
does not lead to unreasonable interference with the owner’s rights.
207. See Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1197 (Alaska 1973) (holding that a broad
interpretation of trust purposes “would stifle private economic development of waterfront
land” by allowing state to eliminate upland rights without compensation).
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public at large from the effects of the state transfer.208 In other words, the upland
owner is a plaintiff with unique standing to challenge public trust violations.
III. APPLYING THE WATERFRONT TAKINGS TEST TO MODERN CASES
How would modern courts use the waterfront takings test to resolve cases
involving oceanfront property? In regulatory takings cases challenging state statutes,
state courts would use the waterfront test to determine the boundary between upland
and state property rights, then decide whether state use or state restrictions on upland
use were consistent with that boundary. In judicial takings cases, federal courts
would determine whether the state’s highest court had, consistent with precedent,
faithfully applied that state’s version of the test to the facts at hand.209
In order to assess the potential of the test, this Part examines whether and how it
could have been applied to oceanfront property cases the Supreme Court has decided
in the last half century. These cases fit into two categories. In the first category, which
includes Hughes and Stop the Beach Renourishment, the facts are similar to those
found in the classic waterfront cases. Specifically, each of those two cases involves
use of state property that abridges upland rights. In the second category of cases,
including Nollan, Stevens, and Lucas, the fact patterns are distinctly modern and
differ from the traditional cases in two important ways. First, in each of the cases,
the state is not physically using its property but rather is attempting to use regulation
in order to protect trust uses, that is, the provision of key services. Second, in order
to achieve this end, the state is limiting upland owners’ core rights to use and enjoy
and to exclude.
A. State Use and Upland Rights: Stop the Beach Renourishment and Hughes
In cases where courts first applied the waterfront test, it was alleged that the state
or its transferee had made direct, physical use of trust lands, to the detriment of
adjacent upland owners. Stop the Beach Renourishment presents identical facts. The

208. A good example of this can be found in Colberg, 432 P.2d at 9. In that case, the State
of California constructed two bridges that blocked a harbor used by the upland owner, a
shipyard. The state argued that the bridges were “consistent with the improvement of
commercial traffic and intercourse” and represented a “use of navigable waterways for
purposes of commerce.” Id. at 11–12. The plaintiff’s claim, although ultimately unsuccessful,
largely rode on its ability to convince the court that using submerged lands for bridges was
outside the scope of the trust. Id. at 12–13.
209. If one accepts that the rules that make up the public trust doctrine are federal law, by
virtue of the broad language of Illinois Central, then it might also be possible, in either setting,
for the U.S. Supreme Court to develop and apply a federal version of the test. Cf. Wilkinson,
supra note 58, at 453–64. The argument would be that, consistent with Illinois Central, a
federal waterfront takings test would ensure that states fulfill their responsibilities to their
citizens to maximize key services provided by trust property. The use of a federal test would
allow the Court to move closer to the normative, constitutional definition of property, at least
in this particular context. See Thompson, supra note 36, at 1523–27. Interestingly, Professor
Wilkinson suggests that state public trust doctrines have roots in the U.S. Constitution.
Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 458–59. A full exploration of the desirability and contours of a
federal test is beyond the scope of this Article.
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State of Florida, through the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (BSPA),210
authorized Walton County to fill state trust lands in order to use them as a renourished
beach.211 The plaintiff, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., was a “nonprofit
corporation formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project
area,” that is, adjacent upland owners (“Members”).212 The plaintiff alleged that the
BSPA’s rule for locating the boundary between upland and state trust property
following the renourishment project213 constituted a taking of two rights belonging
to Members: the “right of contact,” that is, the right to have one’s land remain in
physical contact with the water, and the right to accretions.214
Under Florida common law, littoral owners hold four upland rights: “(1) the right
to have access to the water; (2) the right to reasonably use the water; (3) the right to
accretion and reliction; and (4) the right to the unobstructed view of the water.”215
Also as a matter of common law, “[t]hough subject to regulation, these littoral rights
are private property rights that cannot be taken from upland owners without just
compensation.”216 The State holds “lands seaward of the [mean high-water line],
including the beaches between the mean high and low water lines, in trust for the
public for the purposes of bathing, fishing, and navigation.”217
Although the plaintiff alleged that state use of its trust property would result in a
compensable taking of Members’ upland rights, the two Florida courts that weighed
plaintiff’s case applied neither Penn Central nor Florida’s version of the waterfront
takings test.218 (And, neither of the two courts referred to, or cited, these tests.)
Instead, the Florida courts applied the provisions of Florida Administrative Code rule
18-21.004(3), which provides that “a governmental entity [may] conduct[]

210. Beach and Shore Preservation Act, 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246 (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011–161.45 (West 2012)).
211. See id. § 161.101(1); see also id. § 161.041(1).
212. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 711 (2010).
213. The rule can be found in section 161.191 of the Florida Statute. The effect of the rule
is that the MHTL prior to renourishment would, after renourishment, become a permanent
boundary between the upland property and the state-owned sandy fill. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
161.191 (West 2012). The interposition of sandy fill between the upland property and the sea
would convert the upland owner to an ordinary owner because she would no longer share a
boundary with state trust lands: an upland lot is only an upland lot (with appurtenant upland
rights) to the extent it extends to the legal coastline. The landowner would no longer have
“step-in” access to the ocean, but would have to walk across the new state land to get to the
water. In addition, because she was no longer an upland owner, she could no longer receive
the potential benefits of accretion. See id.
214. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1115, 1119
(Fla. 2008). The “right of contact” is mentioned in an earlier Florida case. Bd. of Trs. of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987).
It does not appear, however, to be a distinct upland right in any state. See Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03 (Amy
K. Kelley ed., 3d ed., 2012).
215. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1111.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1109.
218. See id. at 1116; Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 52
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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restoration and enhancement activities [on submerged lands], provided that such
activities do not unreasonably infringe on riparian rights.”219
Under this framework, the State was faced with a difficult challenge: the
conversion of trust lands adjacent to Members’ upland tracts to sandy, state-owned
beach completely eliminated Members’ “right of contact” and right to accretions.
The State’s best argument regarding the first right was simply that Florida common
law did not recognize a discrete “right of contact,” that is, a right to remain an upland
owner. Rather, the common law gave Members a right of access.220 With respect to
the right to accretions, the State’s best argument was that the right was not a present
right but rather a right to gain title to accretions should they occur in the future.221
Having framed the Members’ rights in this way, the State argued that the
renourishment project did not infringe at all on the Members’ right to accretions, and
that it did not unreasonably infringe on their right of access because the Members
could walk across the filled trust lands to reach the water.222
An administrative law judge agreed with the State, as did the Florida Department
of Environmental Protection. Florida’s First District Court of Appeals did not agree,
holding that “the Beach and Shore Preservation Act deprives the members of their
constitutionally protected riparian rights without just compensation for the property
taken.”223 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed on the grounds that the right to
accretion was a “contingent right,” the right to contact was subsidiary to the right of
access, and the BSPA did not unreasonably interfere with that right of access.224
At the United States Supreme Court, the issue was not whether the statute had
taken the Members’ upland rights. Rather, the question was whether the Supreme
Court of Florida had taken the Members’ “right of contact,”225 by declaring it not to
be a separate right, and their right to accretions, by declaring it to be a “contingent

219. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.004(3)(b) (2015).
220. There was language in an earlier case suggesting that the right of contact was
subsidiary or ancillary to the right of access: “the right of access to the water . . . includ[es]
the right to have the property’s contact with the water remain intact.” Bd. of Trs. of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987).
221. The State also apparently argued that the BSPA authorized the elimination of upland
rights. Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 53–54. This argument would seem ill-suited to a takings
case alleging that the statute eliminated upland rights.
222. The BSPA prohibited the State from erecting structures on the filled trust lands. FLA.
STAT. § 161.201 (West 2012). This prohibition would ensure no future obstacles to Members’
access to the water.
223. Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 60.
224. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1118–21 (Fla.
2008). The court also held that, pursuant to the doctrine of avulsion, the Members would not
own the filled state lands. Id. at 1116. It is not clear what necessitated this finding. In that same
section of the opinion, the court makes a very confusing argument as to why the BSPA, on its
face, does not require compensation. The argument goes something like this: After an avulsive
event, the legal coastline remains the same and both upland owners and the state are entitled
to reclaim their property; thus, when negative avulsion occurs, the state has a right to reclaim
its beach. Id. at 1116–18.
225. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 733 (2010).
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future interest.”226 In other words, the case morphed, on certiorari, from a regulatory
takings case into a judicial takings case.
After holding that the Takings Clause applied to state judicial opinions in the same
way that it applied to state legislation,227 the Court was required to announce a test
for determining when the State owed compensation. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s
suggestion that it adopt the test suggested by Justice Stewart in his concurring
opinion in Hughes v. Washington: “[A] judicial taking consists of a decision that
‘constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant
precedents.’”228 Instead, the Court announced a more straightforward test: whether
the state court opinion “eliminat[ed] an established property right.”229
Unlike the Supreme Court of Florida, the Court did not have to dig deeply into
Florida precedent to determine the exact nature of the Members’ upland rights.230
Instead, the Court took an alternate approach. First, perhaps in its eagerness to find
a vested or “established” right, the plurality misstated Florida law, citing Hayes v.
Bowman for the proposition that “the State as owner of the submerged land . . . has
the right to fill that land, so long as it does not interfere with the rights of the public
and the rights of littoral owners.”231 Florida law, as in all states that distinguish

226. Id. at 713 n.5. The Florida Supreme Court borrowed this term from the law of future
interests; it was probably not the best term to use, given that contingent future interests are
property. In a condemnation action, for example, the holders of such interests may be entitled
to compensation. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 53 cmt. c (1936).
227. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 715 (“If a legislature or a court
declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has
taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its
value by regulation.”) (emphasis omitted).
228. Id. at 728 (quoting 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967)).
229. Id. at 726.
230. Although the question of whether the test adopted by the Court is a wise one with
respect to other kinds of property, courts applying any vestedness-based takings test will
struggle with the nature of upland rights. Even in states with strong upland rights doctrines,
such as Florida, such rights must yield to the State’s paramount interests in protecting trust
uses. So, for example, in Krieter v. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), a Florida
court upheld the state’s denial of an upland owner’s request for a permit, pursuant to her
common law right to wharf out, to build a dock on state trust lands adjacent to her property.
As the court stated, upland rights are “qualified right[s] which must give way to the rights of
the state’s people.” Id. at 112. In short, the strength of upland rights—whether or not they are
“established”—is highly dependent on property-specific facts. In this way, upland rights are
similar to parties’ rights to use and enjoy in the context of a private nuisance case. See supra
Part II.B. This is why the waterfront takings test bears resemblance to private nuisance law in
that it does not emphasize vestedness.
231. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 730. This is an incorrect use of Hayes
v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957), because, as noted above, the Hayes court goes on to
elaborate that the State can interfere with the rights of upland owners where such interference is
not unreasonable. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. In addition to the fact that the
plurality’s use of Hayes is incorrect, it is impossible for the State to fill submerged lands—at
least those adjacent to upland property—without literally interfering with upland rights: filling
converts an upland owner to an ordinary owner. See supra note 213. The question of whether
such literal interference constitutes actionable interference, as the full, correct version of
Florida’s waterfront takings test makes clear, depends on the purpose of the state’s use and, if
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between accretion/erosion and positive/negative avulsion, holds that avulsive events
do not change the legal coastline. Most states, including Florida, also have rules that
prevent landowners from benefiting from artificial accretion; so, for example, a
landowner cannot use groins to trap sand and thus increase the size of his lot. The
Court noted, however, that Florida law permitted the State to benefit from its own
acts of artificial avulsion.232 So, when the State fills in its trust lands with sand, it
continues to own the resulting property.
The Court’s analysis of Florida law on artificial avulsion is technically correct.
However, the Court (as well as the Supreme Court of Florida) could and should have
used Florida’s waterfront takings test to resolve the dispute. As noted above, the
Supreme Court of Florida had established the test in cases such as Hayes v. Bowman:
if the State or its transferee used trust lands for trust purposes, no compensation was
owed; if the use of trust lands was beyond the scope of the trust, compensation was
owed for unreasonable interference with upland rights.233
In assessing the plaintiff’s claim for compensation, the Florida court’s first task
would thus be to decide whether the use of state trust lands for a new beach was in
furtherance of an established trust use. Florida law has long recognized recreation as
a trust use.234 Under the facts of Stop the Beach Renourishment, the renourished
beach would serve three purposes.235 First, it would protect upland property and
structures on that property from future damage caused by storms and other natural
forces. Second, it would protect the public beach (seaward of the MHTL) from future
avulsive events.236 Third, it would provide the public with a dry-sand beach for

that use is outside the scope of the trust, whether the interference is unreasonable. See supra
notes 49–51 and accompanying text. The Court’s use of Hayes is also incorrect in that the
language cited indicates that the State cannot fill its lands in ways that “interfere with the rights
of the public.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 730. In Hayes, for example,
the State had transferred trust lands to the defendant so that the defendant could fill in those
lands and build a residential development on the fill. Because Florida courts have adopted both
the “duty not to dispose” rule from Illinois Central and its exceptions, Florida law allows the
State to interfere with the rights of the public so long as the interference is not substantial.
Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., 146 So. 249, 257–58 (Fla. 1933). Thus, the plaintiff in
Hayes did not argue that the State’s transfer to the defendant was unlawful or that the defendant
was not in lawful possession of the filled lands. Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 798.
232. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 730 (relying on Martin v. Busch, 112
So. 274 (Fla. 1927), for this finding.)
233. See Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 801; Duval Eng’g & Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So. 2d 431,
434 (Fla. 1954); Tampa S. R.R. Co. v. Nettles, 89 So. 223, 223 (Fla. 1921).
234. Watson v. Holland, 20 So. 2d 388, 391 (Fla. 1944) (“The primary uses of most of the
beaches have always been bathing, recreation, fishing and navigation.” (quoting White v.
Hughes, 190 So. 2d 446, 450 (Fla. 1939))).
235. The BSPA defines “beach and shore preservation” as “erosion control, hurricane
protection, coastal flood control, shoreline and offshore rehabilitation, and regulation of work
and activities likely to affect the physical condition of the beach or shore.” FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.021(2) (West 2012). The statute provides that the purposes of renourishment are “to
reduce potential upland damage or mitigate adverse impacts caused by improved, modified,
or altered inlets, coastal armoring, or existing upland development.” Id. § 161.088.
236. Florida law provides that when the MHTL moves landward due to erosion, the legal
coastline moves with it; but, when the MHTL moves landward due to avulsion, the legal
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recreational use. Two of these three purposes are within the scope of the state’s public
trust doctrine. As a result, it is clear that the State was within its rights to renourish
the beach and did not owe the plaintiff compensation for the loss of any of its upland
rights.
As noted at the outset, this is the same result—no compensation—reached by both
the Florida courts and the Supreme Court. So, why does it matter? Both decisions
resulted in far more sweeping impacts than would have resulted from application of
the waterfront test. The Florida opinion created two new interpretations of upland
rights (left standing by the U.S. Supreme Court), even though these interpretations
were unnecessary to deciding the case. The Court’s opinion opens the door, when it
did not have to, to a statute eliminating all upland owners’ rights to accretions. As
noted below, the Supreme Court deemed a similar measure to be potentially
problematic in Hughes v. Washington.
The impact of the Supreme Court’s opinion is even more severe. Although both
artificially lowering the water level of a lake and installing sand do result in avulsive
change, the two actions are technically different: the former is avulsive reliction and
the latter is the avulsive addition of sediment. A willing court could easily distinguish
between the two activities on that ground for policy reasons; creating land by fill is
much easier, especially with respect to oceanfront land. By equating them in the eyes
of Florida law, the Supreme Court has created the possibility that Florida can fill any
of its submerged land, for any purpose, without liability.237 In other words, the State
can eliminate all upland property in Florida whenever and wherever it likes. On the
other hand, application of the waterfront takings test would have limited the use of
compensation-free filling to situations in which filling was in furtherance of public
recreational use of the beach (or another specified trust purpose). Moreover,
application of Florida’s waterfront test would have put context-dependent limits on
both the location and spatial dimensions of future filling activities. As the Supreme
Court itself noted in Yates v. Milwaukee, the test does not allow a State to destroy
upland rights “arbitrarily or capriciously.”238 The best interpretation of this language,
consistent with Farnham’s statement of the test, is that the State can take actions to
maintain trust services only to the degree they are necessary. Thus, for example, the
State would have to show that the width of renourished beach was the minimum
necessary in order to accomplish its goals.239

coastline remains where it was prior to the avulsive event. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1113–14 (Fla. 2008); Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836,
838–39 (Fla. 1970). Thus, after an avulsive event resulting in land loss (“negative avulsion”),
the formerly public area of the beach would be submerged. A wet-sand beach would continue
to exist at the land-water interface, but that area would be within the bounds of the upland
parcel, and thus unavailable for public use.
237. Will the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law now be binding precedent in
Florida courts? If the Court had found a taking, its interpretation of Florida law would seem
to be binding. But, given the finding of no taking, the answer is less clear.
238. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870).
239. This is consistent with the Supreme Court of Florida’s view in Walton County, 998
So. 2d at 1120 n.16 (“Of course, the State is not free to unreasonably distance the upland
property from the water by creating as much dry land between upland property and the water
as it pleases. There is a point where such a separation would materially and substantially impair
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Hughes v. Washington was also a case involving upland owners’ rights to
accretions.240 The law and facts of Hughes, however, are substantially different from
those in Stop the Beach Renourishment. An abridged version of the facts and law in
the case follows.
In the early 1960s, Stella Hughes owned a tract of land near, or possibly bordering,
the Pacific Ocean.241 The seaward boundary of the property was uncertain because,
long prior to Ms. Hughes’s acquisition of the property, accretion had added land to
the boundary of the property as it had been located in 1889.242 This accretion had
continued to add land up until the date Ms. Hughes filed suit against the State of
Washington.243 In the case, the State claimed that it owned all the land that accreted
after 1889; Ms. Hughes claimed she owned it.244
When Washington became a state in 1889, it adopted a constitution that contained
the following provision:
Section 1 Declaration of State Ownership. The state of Washington
asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the
state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where
the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high
water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes . . . .245
Between 1889 and 1966, courts in the State of Washington, including the state’s
highest court, interpreted this constitutional language in two different ways. For the
most part, courts interpreted the words “up to and including the line of ordinary high
tide” to refer to the location of the high-tide line on the effective date of the
constitution, November 11, 1889.246 The competing interpretation was that those
words recognized a migratory legal coastline, that is, that the legal coastline was the
current line of ordinary high tide.247 In a prior case, Ghione v. State, 248 decided in
1946, the Supreme Court of Washington had held that owners of riverfront property

the upland owner’s access, thereby resulting in an unconstitutional taking of littoral rights.”
(citations omitted)). Under the approach taken by Justice Scalia, such limits would not apply.
240. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
241. Id. at 291.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. WASH. CONST. art. XVII.
246. In the lower courts, there had been “73 lawsuits affecting 322 private ownerships . . .
to establish [the location of the legal coastline with respect to specific parcels of property].”
Hughes v. State, 410 P.2d 20, 26 (Wash. 1966) (en banc). “In every one of these cases the
court has divided the accreted lands on the same formula: those accreted lands formed prior to
statehood are the property of the private upland owner; those accreted lands formed since
statehood are public beach and shore.” Id. at 26–27 (quoting, with approval, the opening brief
filed by the State of Washington in the case). The leading expert on Washington law in this
area, Professor Charles E. Corker of the University of Washington School of Law, challenged
the State’s assertion of consistency among these lower court opinions. Corker, supra note 128,
at 87–88.
247. Hughes, 410 P.2d at 30 (Hill, J., dissenting).
248. 175 P.2d 955 (Wash. 1946).
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were entitled to a migratory boundary. Language in the opinion indicating that this
rule also applied to oceanfront property could be characterized as either part of the
holding or mere dicta.249
In deciding Ms. Hughes’s case in 1966, the Supreme Court of Washington held
that Article XVII froze the state’s legal coastline in 1889; while accretions prior to
that date belonged to Ms. Hughes, accreted land formed after that date belonged to
the state.250 Ms. Hughes asked the U.S. Supreme Court to hear her appeal.
On certiorari, the Court first had to decide the question of whether, because Ms.
Hughes’s title could be traced to a prestatehood grant from the federal government,
federal common law established the boundaries of her property.251 If the Court
answered this question in the affirmative, then she was entitled to all accretions, both
pre- and post-1889.252 On the other hand, if the Court held that state property law
governed, then the state owned post-1889 accretions.253 Justice Stewart believed that
state law applied.254 He also believed, however, that the inquiry should not end there.
Based on the facts raised, Justice Stewart addressed two takings questions. First,
whether Article XVII of the Washington Constitution took upland owners’ right of
accretion in 1889 by freezing the legal coastline; and second, if Article XVII was
ambiguous, whether the Supreme Court of Washington took accreted land belonging
to Ms. Hughes when it ignored (or overturned) its earlier ruling, in Ghione v. State,
that Article XVII did not freeze the legal coastline.255 As to the second, Justice
Stewart wrote:
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington . . .
arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, we must of course accept
it as conclusive. But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change in
state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, no such
deference would be appropriate.256
Application of a vested-rights-based test to resolve either of these questions would
result in all-or-nothing results: either the state could or could not eliminate the right
to accretion with respect to any waterfront property in the state. Such result is
inconsistent with the relationship between upland owners and the state and with the
common law upland rights and public trust doctrines. A blanket declaration in this
context is the equivalent of declaring a particular, lawful land use to constitute a
private nuisance regardless of where it occurs. Interestingly, a judicial interpretation
of Article XVII as freezing the legal coastline suffers from the same problem: it
would put all trust lands in the state to a particular use (as areas in which

249. Id. at 961; Hughes, 410 P.2d at 29.
250. Hughes, 410 P.2d at 29.
251. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 290–92 (1967).
252. The Court found that federal common law established a migratory boundary, that is,
a boundary that moved with accretion and erosion. Id. at 293–94.
253. State law, as expressed in the Supreme Court of Washington’s opinion in the case,
established that the boundary was fixed in 1889. Hughes, 410 P.2d at 29.
254. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring).
255. See id. at 295–97.
256. Id. at 296.
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accumulation of sediment could occur) without any protection against unnecessary
or unreasonable impacts on upland owners.
Hughes also raises a particularly interesting question in that the state’s courts, as
early as 1891, had adopted the Gould rule of absolute sovereign control instead of
the waterfront takings test:
[T]ide-lands of this state . . . belong to the state in actual propriety, and .
. . the state has full power to dispose of the same, subject to no
restrictions, save those imposed upon the legislature by the constitution
of the state and the constitution of the United States; and, if this be true,
it necessarily follows that no individual can have any legal right whatever
to claim any easement in, or to impose any servitude upon, the tidewaters within the limits of the state, without the consent of the
legislature.257
Thus, state law would not have provided the Supreme Court of Washington (or the
U.S. Supreme Court) with an option for balancing the State’s need to restrict Ms.
Hughes’s right to accretions against the impact that such a restriction would have on
her ability to use and enjoy her property.258
Given the very significant amount of accretion in the area, freezing the boundary
at 1889 levels would have resulted in nearly two hundred yards of public property
between Ms. Hughes and the Pacific Ocean. Ms. Hughes would have a very good
argument that the State’s use of this much submerged land, for a trust purpose, but
to her detriment, was unnecessary. While a full exploration is beyond the scope of
this Article, it would be consistent with the arguments I have made in this Article for
federal courts to find that if the U.S. Constitution established the parameters of the
public trust doctrine, then it also established parameters of upland rights vis-à-vis the
state.259 In other words, state courts would not be free to apply the rule of absolute
sovereignty to resolve disputes with upland owners, but would instead be required to
apply a federal common law version of the waterfront takings test.260

257. Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 26 P. 539, 541 (Wash. 1891).
258. Freezing the legal coastline can be viewed as either the elimination of the upland
owner’s right to accretions, or a state decision to retain title to submerged lands despite the
fact that nature has filled them with sediment.
259. The Court would have to address language in recent opinions. Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (“[T]he individual States have the authority to define
the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they
see fit.”).
260. Yates v. Milwaukee contains a version of the waterfront test: “[The] riparian right is
property, and is valuable, and, though it must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the
public, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired.” 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497,
504 (1871). Although the case involves upland property located in Wisconsin, the Supreme
Court does not give any indication that it is applying Wisconsin law. Reading this opinion as
applying federal common law is consistent with a similar reading of Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435–36 (1892). See supra note 139.
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B. Externalities of Upland Use as Easements: Lucas and Palazzolo
Although nineteenth-century courts first developed the waterfront takings test to
resolve conflicts between direct state use and upland rights, the economic and legal
relationships between upland owners and the state support, as a conceptual matter,
application of the same principles to other conflicts. For example, in Lucas, the State
adopted a law that, among other things, attempted to prevent landowners from
building too close to the ocean.261 It is not difficult to frame this restriction as an
effort to protect the State’s ability to use its lands for trust purposes or to frame the
external effects of building too close to the beach as requiring the upland owner to
hold an affirmative easement over trust lands.
In Smith v. Maryland,262 the Supreme Court suggested that the public trust
doctrine includes the power to protect key services:
But this soil is held by the State, not only subject to, but in some sense
in trust for, the enjoyment of certain public rights, among which is the
common liberty of taking fish, as well shellfish as floating fish. . . . [The
State] may forbid all such acts as would render the public right less
valuable, or destroy it altogether. This power results from the ownership
of the soil, from the legislative jurisdiction of the State over it, and from
its duty to preserve unimpaired those public uses for which the soil is
held.263
This language can be read as a statement that a state’s police power includes the
power to regulate in order to protect key services. An alternate reading would
construe it to mean that a state’s power to regulate in order to protect key services is
distinct from the police power. The second reading is more compelling, especially
given the last sentence. The power to protect services “results from the ownership of
the soil”; this would not be true of the police power.264 Moreover, the last clause is a
logical and inevitable interpretation of the “duty not to dispose”: it makes little sense
for the public trust doctrine to prevent land transfers that would interfere with public
access to trust uses while at the same time permitting the state to abdicate “its duty
to preserve unimpaired those public uses for which the soil is held.”265 States hold
title to submerged lands not because they are valuable in and of themselves, but
because holding title enables states to ensure public access to key services.266
Mr. Lucas owned two pieces of land which were entirely seaward of what the
state law called the “baseline.”267 Under the terms of the law, he was not permitted

261. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007–08 (1992).
262. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
263. Id. at 74–75 (citations omitted).
264. Id. at 75; see generally Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police
Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007) (describing the police power).
265. Smith, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 75.
266. See Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 459 n.138 (“[T]he public trust doctrine prevents the
substantial impairment of public rights in navigable waterways . . . .”); see also Woodruff v.
N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 785 (D. Cal. 1884).
267. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
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to build a residential structure seaward of the baseline, that is, on his property.268
Both the Supreme Court of South Carolina and the U.S. Supreme Court applied the
standard regulatory takings test to resolve the case.269 At the state supreme court,
Mr. Lucas lost on “no property” grounds: because the state legislature had declared
that building too close to the beach constituted a public nuisance, and because Mr.
Lucas had no right to use his land so as to create a public nuisance, the legislation
did not take any of his property.270 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument
on the ground that giving state legislatures the power to declare anything a public
nuisance would give states a takings trump card of unlimited scope.271 State
legislatures could legislate to prevent nuisances, wrote Justice Scalia, but only when
such rules were rooted in the “background principles of the State’s law of property,”
that is, when the state could have prevented the activity in question by taking
landowners to court.272
Although he does not discuss or mention the State’s waterfront takings test,
Justice Scalia’s logic is entirely consistent with application of the test. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina adopted the waterfront takings test in 1913.273 Applying that
test to the facts of Lucas, the first question would be whether, in the specific case of
Lucas’s property, the rule was necessary to protect trust services, namely the public
beach seaward of Mr. Lucas’s property. There are several arguments that the State
could make in support of this claim. First, homes built too close to the beach in areas
subject to frequent and severe erosion are likely to spend some time seaward of the
legal coastline, that is, literally on the public beach. Second, allowing landowners to
build too close to the beach is likely to result in landowners’ future need or desire to
construct seawalls or other structures that would be harmful to the public beach. At
the same time, the setting of Mr. Lucas’s properties could support a strong
counterargument that prohibiting him from building on his land was not necessary
for the protection of trust services. Specifically, because South Carolina had adopted
the challenged rule in 1988, after all other lots in the area had been built upon, Mr.
Lucas could argue that the homes he would build would not significantly add to the
threat.
Application of the waterfront test in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island274 would have
helped the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and the U.S. Supreme Court contend with
a troublesome vestedness issue; namely, does the takings clause have “an expiration
date”?275 In Palazzolo, the landowner owned a twenty-acre parcel that shared a
boundary with the state along Winnipaug Pond, “an intertidal inlet often used by
residents for boating, fishing, and shellfishing.”276 Mr. Palazzolo’s property

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1015–16. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899–902 (S.C. 1991).
Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899–902.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
Id. at 1029.
See McDaniel v. Greenville-Carolina Power Co., 78 S.E. 980 (S.C. 1913).
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 613.
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contained a large section of “salt marsh subject to tidal flooding” with the rise and
fall of water levels in the inlet.277
After several attempts to obtain state permission to fill the salt marsh on his
property in order to develop it, Mr. Palazzolo sued the state, claiming that state
rules regulating the fill of sensitive wetlands (as the state had classified his)
resulted in an effective condemnation of his property.278 Mr. Palazzolo lost his case
in the state courts; among other rationales, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held
that Mr. Palazzolo could not obtain compensation because the state had adopted
the rules he complained of prior to the date he acquired his property.279 The court
focused on language in Penn Central to the effect that “[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant” will be measured with an eye toward “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.”280 It reasoned that, where an individual has notice of restrictions on
his property at the time of purchase, he cannot reasonably make investments in the
property based on a belief that those regulations will not apply to the property in
the future.281
The Supreme Court took the case on certiorari and ultimately remanded the case
back to Rhode Island. The Justices who voted to remand the case, while all
agreeing that the “notice rule” did not bar the claim, had sharply different views
on why this was true.282 Under a waterfront takings test analysis, the fact that the
property owner had notice of the restriction would be of no import. The test
acknowledges the primacy of the longstanding relationship between the upland
owner and the state; put differently, the test seeks to promote the provision of key
trust services. The law should not prevent an upland owner from using his property
in furtherance of trust purposes; similarly, laws preventing uses that unreasonably
interfere with trust services are simply “the result that could have been achieved in
the courts.”283
In Palazzolo, the direct ecological connection between the salt marsh and trust
services—the creation of opportunities for fishing and shellfishing in Winnipaug
Pond—would have strongly supported a finding that filling that marsh would have
had an unreasonable impact.284 This finding would, of course, depend on the State’s
ability to prove the existence of that connection, and that the loss of salt marsh on
Mr. Palazzolo’s property would have more than a negligible impact on the provision
of key services.

277. Id.
278. Id. at 615.
279. Id. at 616.
280. Id. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
281. Id. at 626–30 (Kennedy, J.).
282. Id. at 626–30; id. at 632–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
283. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
284. See Donald F. Boesch & R. Eugene Turner, Dependence of Fishery Species on Salt
Marshes: The Role of Food and Refuge, 7 ESTUARIES 460 (1984) (describing the benefits of
salt marshes); Charlene Van Raalte, What’s the Use of a Salt Marsh?, 39 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR.
285 (1977) (same).
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C. Externalities of Trust Use as Easements: Nollan, Stevens and Public Use of
Private Dry-Sand Beaches
Perhaps the most controversial oceanfront property takings cases are those where
the State, through legislation but more commonly through the courts, limits upland
owners’ rights to exclude the public from the dry-sand part of the beach.285 Such
cases include Nollan286 and Stevens,287 as well as cases which never made it to the
Supreme Court, like the New Jersey beach cases.288 If upland property is viewed as
ordinary property, then limits on the right to exclude can seem radical.289 If, on the
other hand, upland property owners are viewed as not only privileged beneficiaries
of, but also partners in, the public trust, and if such limits are judiciously applied,
then such measures might seem fairer. More important, it is possible to view these
limits as consistent with the well-established common law maxim of legal coastline
property, “[t]he rights may be said to be reciprocal, each modifying the other, each
to be used so as not to unreasonably interfere with the other right.”290
A state’s best argument is that the limitation on the right to exclude is necessary
in order to maintain the value of the recreation service provided by the wet-sand
beach. (Recall that courts use the “necessary” requirement to prevent “arbitrary and
capricious” use of the state’s trust trump card.291) A dry-sand trust easement is
essentially the inverse of the right to wharf out: it is an easement appurtenant to trust
lands that extends over upland property. Like the right to wharf out, the state’s right
to establish such an easement should depend on the physical setting of the adjacent
property.292

285. Rose, supra note 53, at 753–58.
286. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
287. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1207 (1994).
288. The most important New Jersey beach case, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), was not a takings case. It was brought as something akin to
a quiet title action, seeking a public right to use a privately-owned, dry-sand beach. Given that
the state’s courts ruled in favor of the public, the landowners could have filed for certiorari to
the Supreme Court under a judicial takings theory. Given the result in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, it is possible that a landowner would, in the future, follow that course of
action.
289. There are long-standing rules of property that place significant limitations on property
owners’ rights to exclude. Specifically, under the ancient English “law of innkeeping,” the
innkeeper “has no right to say to one, you shall come into my inn, and to another you shall
not.” Rex v. Ivens, 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (1835). Admittedly, the rationale for this rule differs
because the beachfront owner is not inviting anyone onto her property. At the same time, the
rule was based on the road-side location of inns and justified as an exchange for the privilege
of operating an inn. See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Medieval Innkeeper and His Responsibility,
18 GREEN BAG 269 (1906) (describing the business of an innkeeper in medieval England).
290. 1 FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 137–38.
291. See supra notes 238–239 and accompanying text.
292. As noted earlier, rights to wharf out “differed in the different Colonies, and in some
were created by statute, while in others they rested upon usage only.” Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 18 (1894) (emphasis added).

902

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:851

So, for example, in Nollan, the alleged taking in the case would have been the
State’s acquisition of a right-of-way easement across the dry-sand portion of the
Nollans’ property. (The State of California had demanded that the Nollans dedicate
the easement in exchange for a permit to build a larger home on their oceanfront lot.)
Justice Scalia’s view was that, standing alone, the State’s imposition of an easement
would have been a taking.293 This assessment is based on a standard, vested-rights
analysis: the right to exclude is “most essential” and a rule limiting the right to
exclude in this way, that is, opening the private property to public use would “no
doubt” be a taking.294
Under the waterfront test, as noted above, the first question would be whether the
limitation on the Nollans’ property was necessary to the preservation of key services
in the area. The Nollans would have a strong argument that this was not the case:
after all, there were two public, dry-sand beaches within a quarter mile of their
property; the addition of more dry-sand access would not seem necessary to the
supply of recreational services. The State could argue other specifics: for example,
that the seawall on the Nollans’ property had reduced the amount of public wet-sand
beach and, therefore, the use of their dry-sand beach was necessary; that the same
seawall would not only have buffered the Nollans from visual disruption (seeing the
public), but also physical and visual infringement of their privacy; that, as Justice
Brennan noted,295 impacts on the Nollans would be limited given the fact that the
dry-sand portion of the beach was only ten-feet wide at high tide; and that, given the
difficulty of enforcing trespass rules on unstable beaches like the Nollans’, limiting
their right to bring trespass cases would not be a significant alteration of their
rights.296
The advantage of applying the waterfront test to this case is that it would avoid
extremes. The Court’s ruling would not prevent the state from acquiring easements
in the future, but rather would provide the state with an incentive for describing and
measuring the harms generated by proposed projects in ways that would satisfy the
Court’s tests in Nollan297 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.298 In states like New Jersey,
where the dedication of lateral access has been formalized into a rule, the waterfront
test would allow landowners to argue that allowing such access on their property was
unnecessary and unreasonable.

293. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987).
294. Id. at 831.
295. Id. at 853–54 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
296. On sandy beaches, upland owners and the public will often have difficulty pinpointing
the exact location of the boundary. If the upland owner, for example, hired a surveyor to stake
out the location of the MHTL, the resulting line would remain accurate only as long as the
inputs—the mean high-tide plane and the beach profile—did not change. While the former is
only subject to change every 18.6 years or so, the latter is in a state of continual change, rates
of change being of course dependent upon the extent of wave and wind activity in the area and
the geology of the land (waves and wind move sand more easily than rock). Thus, the accuracy
of the surveyed line would decrease with the passage of time; as days and weeks went by,
neither the landowner nor the public could be certain as to the precise location of the boundary.
See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text.
297. 483 U.S. 825.
298. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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Such arguments would also be available in cases with facts such as those
presented by Stevens.299 In an earlier Oregon case, State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,300
the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the public had a customary right to use
“ocean-front lands” from the “northern to the southern border of the state . . . .”301 In
a case decided later, about five years before Stevens, the Supreme Court of Oregon
interpreted Thornton as requiring a “factual predicate” before a court could recognize
a public right to use a specific beach.302 In other words, while the first case opened
all oceanfront land to public use, the second narrowed the holding to particular tracts
of oceanfront land. In Stevens, the Supreme Court of Oregon was loyal to the more
recent holding, but—according to Justices Scalia and O’Connor—found the dry-sand
part of Stevens’s property open to the public, but without the requisite factual
inquiry.303
All of this confusion could be avoided with use of the waterfront takings test. In
fact, the reason the Oregon courts seemed to pull back from Thornton in McDonald
was that the beach in question there was virtually inaccessible by anyone other than
the landowners and one neighboring property owner. Under the waterfront test, it
would be nearly impossible for the State to show that public access to this property
was necessary to maintain the provision of recreational services.304
CONCLUSION
Based on the frequency with which the Supreme Court has heard oceanfront
property cases over the past three decades, it is very likely that the Court (and state
courts) will regularly confront similar issues in the future. The waterfront takings test
offers the possibility of resolving these conflicts in a manner that is more consistent
with the owner-owner relationship between the parties and, more important, has the
potential to result in more optimal use of valuable coastal property.305

299. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1207 (1994).
300. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
301. Id. at 676.
302. McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or. 1989). The court seemed to be
mixing a prescriptive theory with the theory of custom. For an explanation of the difference
between the two, see David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access
and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996).
303. Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212 (Scalia & O’Connor JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). More accurately, the Justices argued that the Stevens court relied on factual findings
that, in fact, were never made in Thornton.
304. Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey did not apply the waterfront test in cases
such as Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), it did
employ a similar, measured approach to public, dry-sand access. In Matthews, the court
allowed public access only to the property at issue in the case, and under a set of conditions
that limited the amount of that access so as to not unreasonably burden the upland owner. Id.
at 331–33 (holding that upland owner, beach club, must make only a “reasonable quantity” of
daily and seasonal passes available to non-residents and is permitted to charge “reasonable
fees” for those passes to offset costs of lifeguards, beach-cleaning, and insurance).
305. While there are some costs involved in using different tests for different kinds of
property, those costs would not seem to be significant here. The primary costs would be related

904

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:851

It is easy to understand why courts have, until now, found it appealing to frame
all takings cases as stories in which the government is the rights cutter and the
property owner is the rights holder; diminution-based tests, measuring the impacts
of government action on private rights, provide a convenient methodology and is
intuitively consistent with a sense of what is just to the landowner. But, real property
is unique, and oceanfront property is even more so. No other form of property is
defined by its shared boundary with state-owned land and is so dependent on adjacent
state-owned land for its value. As nineteenth-century courts realized, an excessive
emphasis on prior rights did not represent an optimal conflict-resolution mechanism
in waterfront cases: for one thing, it would have put limits on the ability of upland
owners and the state to maximize the value of their respective property over the long
term. These courts’ alternative approach for determining government liability,
embodied in the waterfront takings test, made substantially more sense.

to sorting property into categories and development of the law. Identifying oceanfront land is
not difficult. And, nineteenth-century courts have done at least some of the work toward
development of the law.
Interestingly, there are only a few articles that have explored the relationship between the
takings clause and different types of property. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, Eastern Enterprises,
Phillips, Money, and the Limited Role of the Just Compensation Clause in Protecting Property
“in Its Larger and Juster Meaning,” 51 ALA. L. REV. 937 (2000) (Takings Clause and money);
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1608 (1993) (Takings Clause and
public rights in intellectual property); Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private
Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV.
689 (2007) (Takings Clause and patents).

